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FOREWORD
North Korea is a country of paradoxes and
contradictions. Although it remains an economic
basket case that cannot feed and clothe its own people,
it nevertheless possesses one of the world’s largest
armed forces. Whether measured in terms of the total
number of personnel in uniform, numbers of special
operations soldiers, the size of its submarine fleet,
quantity of ballistic missiles in its arsenal, or its substantial weapons of mass destruction programs, Pyongyang
is a major military power. North Korea’s latest act to
demonstrate its might was the seismic event on
October 9, 2006.
The authors of this monograph set out to assess the
capabilities and discern the intentions of North Korea’s
People’s Army. This publication is the fourth in a
series titled “Demystifying North Korea,” the products
of a project directed by Dr. Andrew Scobell. The first
monograph, North Korea’s Strategic Intentions, written
Dr. Scobell, was published in July 2005. The second
monograph, Kim Jong Il and North Korea: The Leader
and the System, also written by Dr. Scobell, appeared
in March 2006. The third monograph, North Korean
Civil-Military Trends: Military-First Politics to a Point,
written by Mr. Ken Gause, appeared in October 2006.
Future monographs will examine North Korea’s foreign
relations, economy, and assess future scenarios.
The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to publish
this series.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute


SUMMARY
Since the inception of the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea (DPRK) in 1948, the Pyongyang
regime has had two national strategic objectives: (1)
the perpetuation of the regime; and (2) reunification
of the Korean Peninsula under North Korea’s control.
Militarism has remained an essential aspect of the
DPRK throughout its existence, and the armed forces
constitute a central element of the regime. The Korean
People’s Army (KPA), the name given to all services
of North Korea’s military, is the core element for the
realization of North Korea's national strategy. This
strategy calls for giving priority to military issues over
everything else and the DPRK constitutes the most
militarized state on earth measured by a variety of
indicators.
The KPA emerged from guerrilla origins in the 1920s
and then evolved into a hybrid force with elements of
Soviet and Chinese doctrines and organization. It has
adjusted as a result of learning from conflicts waged
elsewhere in the world. This tradition embraces the
concept of self-reliance and self-sufficiency consistent
with the DPRK ideology of Juche.
North Korean military doctrine has shifted
dramatically away from the doctrine of regular
warfare to a doctrine that embraced People's War.
Kim Il Sung espoused “Four Military Lines”: (1) arm
the entire population; (2) fortify the entire country;
(3) train the entire army as a "cadre army"; and (4)
modernize weaponry, doctrine, and tactics under the
principle of Juche in national defense. Military doctrine
was refined further to incorporate the concepts of
“combined operations” and “two-front war.” The
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combined operations doctrine called for the integration
of guerrilla warfare operations (small unit) with
conventional ground force operations (large unit).
This integrated doctrine probably has been modified
to include Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). The
two-front war doctrine calls for close coordination
of conventional frontline operations with guerrilla
and special operations deep within South Korea and
possibly elsewhere. The First Front traditionally has
been the massive conventional KPA force along the
Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), while the focus for the
Second Front has been the rear area of South Korea.
To support these objectives and doctrine, since
the end of the Korean War the KPA has developed
into a massive armed force, 1.2 million strong, with
substantial military capabilities—both conventional
and unconventional. The KPA is the world’s fourth
largest military in terms of manpower, with the world’s
largest Special Operation Forces (SOF) and submarine
fleet. Some 40 percent of the populace serve in some
military, paramilitary, or defense-related industry and
can be mobilized easily for war.
In addition to sizeable conventional forces, North
Korea has significant WMD and ballistic missile
programs. Nuclear weapons almost certainly were on
Kim Il Sung’s mind from 1945 onward. He was impressed by the power of the bombs used on Hiroshima and
Nagasaki, both in terms of their destructive capacity
and their value as a political weapon. The DPRK’s quest
for a nuclear program began in the 1950s. Pyongyang
has multiple reasons for keeping the program and no
obvious good or compelling reasons to give it up.
North Korea possesses at least enough plutonium
to make a handful of nuclear bombs. Still, it is entirely
possible that Pyongyang does not have a weapon.
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The evidence from the October 9, 2006, underground
explosion remains inconclusive, and the authors
estimate that the DPRK has anywhere from zero to
13 nuclear weapons. North Korea has good reasons
to play a game of “nuclear ambiguity.” Nevertheless,
prudence demands that the United States and its allies
proceed on the assumption that the DPRK has a nuclear
weapon.
Whether or not Pyongyang has an explicit doctrine,
it almost certainly has some guiding principles for
when and how to employ whatever nuclear devices
it possesses. While one cannot rule out a nuclear
first strike by Pyongyang, given the extremely small
amount of nuclear weapon making material available
and almost certain massive retaliation North Korea
could expect from the United States, it appears more
likely that North Korea’s nuclear doctrine is focused
on deterring an attack by the United States and as a
way to gain leverage at the negotiating table. It is far
from certain whether Pyongyang yet has mastered the
ability to build a nuclear warhead from its plutonium
stockpiles. Moreover, its preferred delivery system
cannot be assumed. Its first choice might be ballistic
missiles, but this option may be discounted if a
warhead cannot be built. Furthermore, there may be
grave doubts about the accuracy of the missiles. This
may lead to the consideration of other options such as
air or maritime delivery.
The DPRK perceives chemical agents more as an
operational force multiplier, rather than as a strategic
asset. Chemical weapons likely will be used at the
outset of any conflict against frontline forces via
artillery, against rear area targets on the peninsula via
long-range artillery, short-range ballistic missiles, and
via unconventional means with the assistance of SOF.
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Moreover, it is possible chemical weapons could be
used against U.S. military assets in East Asia delivered
via medium-range ballistic or unconventional means.
In short, it must be assumed that if the KPA launches
an attack, chemical weapons will be employed.
Pyongyang’s biological warfare program is far
less developed than its nuclear, chemical, or ballistic
missile counterparts. This is true in terms of evolution,
capabilities, readiness, and doctrine. Nonetheless, it
must be assumed that North Korea has a significant
biological weapons capability, along with the will and
means to employ them.
North Korea has had a ballistic missile program for
more than 4 decades. The program, created by Kim Il
Sung, has been a top national priority from the start.
Utilizing technological assistance from a handful of
countries, foreign trained technicians and scientists,
and reverse engineering, Pyongyang has succeeded
in establishing a credible indigenous ballistic missile
manufacturing base. The first phase produced shortrange missiles for export and domestic deployment;
the second phase produced medium-range missiles for
the same. In the third—current—phase, North Korea
has turned to research and development, and testing—
but not yet the production, deployment, or export—of
long-range missiles.
Currently, North Korea is thought to possess
between 600 and 800 short- and medium-range ballistic
missiles. This number is only likely to increase with
steady output by the military industrial complex. And
if testing continues, the DPRK eventually will produce
and deploy long-range missiles capable of reaching
Alaska, Hawaii, and some day, the continental United
States.
The short- and medium-range missiles originally
were produced for defense and deterrence against the


United States and South Korea, but the missiles could,
of course, be used offensively. Pyongyang recognized
that there was a market for missiles and it could profit
from exports of ballistic missiles and related technology.
North Korea’s missile program also became important
as a status symbol to bolster the prestige of the regime,
both domestically and internationally. By the late
1990s, Pyongyang realized the value of the program
for diplomatic leverage.
The missiles could be fitted with WMD warheads.
The critical question is whether Pyongyang has the
capability to place nuclear (or chemical or biological)
warheads on any of its ballistic missiles. It is not clear
whether North Korea has developed the ability to mate
a nuclear weapon with a ballistic missile. Nevertheless,
one must proceed under the assumption that, at
present, Pyongyang can deliver a chemical warhead
and, in the not too distant future, will be able to deliver
a nuclear warhead on the tip of a short- or mediumrange missile.
As impressive as the statistics on North Korean
conventional and unconventional forces are, their actual
capabilities are less than the raw data suggest, given
the obsolescence of most KPA equipment, shortage of
spare parts and fuel, and poor maintenance. Moreover,
South Korea’s impressive strides in the acquisition of
modern weapons and sophisticated technology, along
with its burgeoning economy, further decreases North
Korea’s chances of executing successful offensive
operations on the peninsula. However, if given the
order to attack, the KPA will do so.
Although it is difficult to know North Korea’s
precise intentions or aspirations, its forces are deployed
along the demilitarized zone (DMZ) in such a manner
that they could support an invasion of South Korea.
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Currently, North Korea deploys approximately 70
percent of its military units, and up to 80 percent of
its estimated aggregate firepower, within 100km of
the DMZ. North Korea theoretically could invade
the South without recourse to further deployments
and with minimal warning time. But North Korea’s
armed forces also are positioned in order to deter an
attack, being deployed to deliver a preemptive strike
against the South if Pyongyang believes that an attack
is imminent or to retaliate with overwhelming force if
the North is attacked.
While the KPA’s capacity to sustain offensive
operations beyond days and weeks is questionable,
North Korea retains the ability to inflict heavy casualties
and collateral damage, largely through the use of
massed long-range artillery. In effect, Pyongyang’s
most credible conventional threat is to devastate Seoul
(and a good portion of South Korea) rather than to
seize and hold it.
If North Korea intends to attack when conditions
are deemed auspicious, the KPA must rely on certain
factors to tip the odds in its favor (e.g., element of
surprise, the United States being deployed in a major
conflict elsewhere in the world). Just as important—
if not more important—than the performance of
conventional KPA forces along the DMZ would be the
execution of numerous Second Front operations by
SOF forces in rear areas.
North Korea continues to develop its nuclear and
missile programs. Moreover, questions remain as to
North Korea’s military intentions. Does Pyongyang
intend to use its WMD and ballistic missiles to replace
the threat posed by its eroding conventional forces? Or
is its intention to use conventional and unconventional
forces in what it might view as a winning combination?
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The answer to these questions are likely to be evident
only in time as analysts discern trends in North Korea’s
conventional and unconventional forces.
North Korea’s conventional threat also is sufficient
to make an allied preemptive invasion to overthrow the
North Korean regime a highly unattractive option. In
theory, U.S. forces could carry out preemptive attacks
to destroy known North Korean nuclear facilities and
missile emplacements, but such attacks could provoke
North Korean retaliation and trigger a general conflict.
Moreover, Washington and Seoul cannot overthrow the
North Korean regime by force or destroy its strategic
military assets without risking devastating losses in the
process. Meanwhile, North Korea cannot invade the
South without inviting a fatal counterattack from the
United States and South Korea. Thus, the balance of
forces that emerged from the Korean War, and which
helped maintain the armistice for more than 50 years,
remains in place.
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North Korea’s Military THREAT:
pYONGYANG’S CONVENTIONAL FORCES,
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION,
and BALLISTIC MISSILES
I. INTRODUCTION
Scope and Limitations.
North Korea, or as it prefers to be known officially,
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK),
possesses a massive armed force with substantial
military capabilities—both conventional and unconventional. Most experts agree that the Korean People’s
Army (KPA) is the world’s fourth largest military in
terms of manpower with the world’s largest Special
Forces (SOF) component, behind China, the United
States, and India (see Figure 1).1
Ranks

Nation

Active Troops

1

People’s Republic of China

2,255,000

2

United States

1,474,000

3

India

1,325,000

4

North Korea

1,106,000

Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies,
Military Balance 2005-06, London: Oxford University
Press, 2005.

Figure 1. World Military Comparisons.
North Korea’s military first gained world attention
in June 1950 when it launched a surprise attack that
started the Korean War (See “Korean War” Box).



June 1950: North Korea Attacks!
The North Korean rapid and overwhelming success
startled the United States and its allies. By mid-1950
North Korean forces numbered between 150,000 and
200,000 troops, organized into 10 infantry divisions, one
tank division, and one air force division, with 210 fighter
planes and 280 tanks. Soviet equipment, including
automatic weapons of various types, T-34 tanks, and Yak
fighter planes, had also been pouring into North Korea
in early 1950. These forces were to fight the ill-equipped
South Korean army of less than 100,000 men—an army
lacking in tanks, heavy artillery, and combat airplanes,
plus a coast guard of 4,000 men and a police force of
45,000 men.2
In a matter of days, the KPA had captured South
Korea’s capital of Seoul. Using seven divisions—in its first
wave and five more in its second wave, the KPA moved
south pushing the Republic of Korea (ROK) forces before
it. Western military experts were stunned by the KPA’s
battlefield successes.3
The U.S. intelligence community was not focused on
North Korea in 1950 and knew very little about North
Korea or its military. In fact, prior to June 25, the United
States had paid very little attention to North Korea at all.4
Today, in contrast, North Korea is very much a focus of a
significant intelligence targeting effort.

Experts also concur that North Korea possesses
an extensive ballistic missile arsenal and significant
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) capabilities.
However, there is considerable disagreement over the
precise number of regular and SOF forces, as well as
capabilities and readiness. Moreover, analysts debate
about the KPA’s doctrine and disposition, especially
in regard to the offensive or defensive nature of the
KPA.


Over the past 2 decades, due largely to economic
decline and lack of financial resources, as well as force
improvements and urban build-up in South Korea
and the continued presence of U.S. forces in South
Korea, North Korea’s conventional forces have become
weaker, relative to those of South Korea and the United
States. As a result, any North Korean option to invade
South Korea has become less credible.5
While causing tremendous damage, a North Korean
attack on South Korea would most likely be defeated
by a U.S.–South Korean counterattack. Nonetheless,
the credibility of North Korea’s conventional military
forces remains largely intact in terms of their potential
to defend the state and to inflict substantial damage
on South Korea—especially Seoul—which remains
hostage to North Korea’s artillery massed along the
Demilitarized Zone (DMZ).6
By the same token, options for U.S. and allied
forces to launch strikes against selected North Korean
military targets are fraught with steep risks. The
United States probably could destroy known nuclear
and missile facilities in a preemptive strike, but not
hidden facilities and weapons that would survive
such a preemptive attack. In any event, Pyongyang
would regard an attack on its strategic assets as a dire
threat to its vital interests (i.e., regime survival) and
could retaliate in ways that might escalate quickly to
a wider conflict. The United States and South Korea
would more than likely prevail in a full-scale war, but
the human and material costs would be very high—
even if unconventional weapons were not employed.
In essence, the military standoff that marked the end
of the Korean War prevails 50 years later.7
Regarding WMD, while there is general consensus
that North Korea possesses a significant stockpile



of chemical agents, there is serious debate about the
status of Pyongyang’s biological and nuclear programs.
Furthermore, there is a range of expert views of North
Korea’s ballistic missile programs.
What are North Korea’s military capabilities and
intentions? What is the size of the KPA and its SOF
component? Is the KPA’s doctrine offensive and how
would we know if it was or not? What is the status
of North Korea’s WMD programs? What kind of
capabilities and doctrines does North Korea possess in
terms of nuclear, chemical, and biological programs?
What can be said about North Korea’s ballistic
missile capabilities? How have North Korea’s chronic
economic difficulties affected these capabilities and/or
altered Pyongyang’s military strategies or doctrines?
Is the KPA’s military readiness atrophying because of
the WMD programs, whether from lack of economic
resources or doctrinal decisions? What main trends are
evident in the KPA over the course of its existence?
This monograph will examine the armed forces of
the DPRK, both conventional and unconventional. The
official North Korean name of all branches of North
Korea’s armed forces is the Chosen Inking or KPA.8
This monograph will address the following topics:
the political context of the military in the DPRK; the
origins and evolution of the armed forces; and the
KPA’s command and control structure and its WMD
and conventional components, including doctrines.
Pyongyang’s capabilities and intentions also will be
assessed.
At the outset, it is important to delineate the scope
and limitations of this monograph. Perhaps it is best
to begin by stating what this is not. The monograph
is not an order of battle, tactical primer, or complete
military history of North Korea or detailed overview



of the KPA. These can be found elsewhere.9 Nor is this
a complete history of Pyongyang’s WMD or missile
programs—these too have been covered elsewhere.10
Context and Structure: A Party-Military-State.
One of the most important and perhaps least
understood topics in this monograph is the politics
of the military. Unlike concrete subjects such as the
types and capabilities of weapon systems and number
of personnel in uniform, it is an amorphous topic that
is difficult if not impossible to quantify or gauge with
any statistical precision.
Institutions: The Party-Military-State (PMS). The
term often used to label a communist regime is “Partystate” since the communist party apparatus of a country
tends to be intertwined with and critical to functioning
of the governmental apparatus. The ruling communist
party in North Korea is called the Korea Workers’ Party
(KWP).11 In fact, “party-state” is a misnomer because
it excludes mention of a third key bureaucratic actor:
the armed forces. A more appropriate hyphenation
therefore is “party-military-state (PMS).”12 The DPRK
also has been labeled a “garrison state.” In such a state,
the “consuming focus” is girding for war and “all
efforts are directed toward building and supplying
a powerful and well-equipped military.”13 And the
highest status and prestige belongs to the soldier.14
Indeed, the KPA is the fourth largest military in the
world in terms of men and women in uniform, with
possibly over 1.2 million personnel.15 But this statistic
does not reflect adequately the size of the armed forces
relative to the size of North Korea. If measured in terms
of soldiers per thousand population, the comparative
size of the KPA readily becomes more apparent. At



44.3 per thousand population, North Korea is by far the
largest military in the communist bloc past or present,
not to mention in the larger contemporary world.16
In addition, North Korea has almost 7 1/2 million
paramilitary reserves. This means that some 40 percent
of the populace serve in some military or paramilitary
formation. In short, the DPRK is undoubtedly the
“most militarized state on earth.”17
The military in a PMS is a highly-privileged
institution usually possessing prestige and resources
on a par with the Party. Indeed, it is sometimes
described as “state within a state” to the extent that it is
often “buffered” or protected from domestic or foreign
shocks.18 The KPA’s situation in North Korea appears
to be an extreme instance of a military’s power and
influence. The exalted and central position held by the
armed forces in the DPRK appears unparalleled in the
annals of an established communist regime.19 While
the power of the military invariably is high during a
communist movement’s struggle for power and in the
early years of a communist regime, this usually lessens
over time. In North Korea, the power and influence of
the KPA has only increased in recent years and may
have replaced the KWP as the dominant political force
in the DPRK. This is the result of a concerted effort by
North Korean dictator, Kim Jong Il, to rely heavily on
the armed forces at the expense of the KWP. Since 1998,
the so-called “Military-First” Policy has resulted in the
KPA becoming “the most significant political actor” in
the DPRK with top priority for resources.20
Dictators and Marshals: Father and Son. In partymilitary-states, the dictator seeks to maintain close—
often hands-on—control of the armed forces. This was
true in countries such as the former Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics (USSR) and remains true in China



and Cuba. It also is true in North Korea. Like Stalin, Mao,
and Castro, Kim Il Sung undertook purges of military
leaders and promotions of those faithful to him, all to
ensure the loyalty of generals to him personally. In each
case, the supreme political leader took the ceremonial
and official position as the commander in chief of the
armed forces. But Kim Il Sung took it a step further than
Stalin, Mao, and Castro—he had himself declared a
Marshal (similar to a five-star general or General of the
Army status), and it was in this capacity as commander
of the KPA that he signed the Korean Armistice on
July 27, 1953, along with Peng Dehuai, commander of
the Chinese People’s Volunteers, and Mark W. Clark,
commander of the UN Command.21 Moreover, Kim Il
Sung went even further than his Soviet and Chinese
contemporaries by controlling the assignment and
promotion of every senior military officer.22 Kim’s son,
Kim Jong Il, had the title of Marshal conferred upon
him when he was appointed deputy chairman of the
National Defense Commission (NDC) in 1992. The
NDC is the highest war control and military command
organization in North Korea.23
Party-Army Relations: Structure vs. Mindset. In 2007,
the organizational model of North Korea’s armed forces
is a hybrid of Soviet and Chinese models and modified to
peninsular objectives and refined with lessons learned
from recent global conflicts. But more important are the
distinctly Korean Partisan characteristics that emerged
from the guerrilla origins of the armed band led by
Kim Il Sung in Manchuria in the 1930s and 1940s (see
“Origins and Evolution” in the Conventional Forces
section). Indeed, psychologically, the KPA is very much
an indigenous force that considers itself to be heir to
the tradition of Kim Il Sung’s Partisans. Officially, the
KPA traces its roots back to the band of communist
fighters founded by Kim on April 25, 1932.24


This tradition embraces the concept of self-reliance
and self-sufficiency consistent with the ideology
of Juche.25 But the reality is one of multiple military
traditions and considerable arms and technical
assistance from abroad, especially from the Soviet
Union and China. Significant numbers of the soldiers
who formed the first KPA force in the late 1940s
trained and fought with Chinese communists while
others—including Kim Il Sung in the years from
1941 to 1945—trained and fought with the Soviets.26
Nevertheless, KPA leaders are indoctrinated to believe
they are 21st century Partisans. North Korean military
leaders therefore are imbued with intense nationalism
combined with significant distrust of foreigners and
foreign governments, including Russia and China.
Military politics appears to have evolved through
three models of communist types. During the period
prior to the establishment of the communist regime
in Pyongyang in 1945, the model of civil-military
relations was “Partisan,” in which the party and the
army leadership were one and the same. During the
period from the establishment of a Pyongyang regime
to the Korean War armistice in mid-1953, the KPA
approximated the “Soviet” model whereby military
and civilian leaders worked closely together. But by
the end of the Korean War, Kim Il Sung had purged
many military (and civilian) leaders, hence ensuring
that relations between the top KWP leadership and
KPA leadership were much closer and similar to the
symbiotic relationship characteristic of the “Chinese”
model to become a hybrid or distinctively “Korean”
model.”27
Military Industrial Complex (MIC). Consistent with
the prominent role of the military in the DPRK with
the highest priority for national resources, the core



of North Korea’s economy is controlled by the KPA,
managed by the Second Economy Commission, and
directed towards supplying the needs of the armed
forces. The top economic priority afforded defense in
the DPRK is not surprising. But what is surprising is
that North Korea’s Military Industrial Complex (MIC)
is far more sizeable relative to its economy than any
other in a communist PMS.28 Indeed, a leading expert
has declared that the DPRK has the “most militarized
economy on earth.”29
Most analyses of North Korea’s defense sector
estimate that defense spending constitutes between
one-quarter and one-third of all government spending.
As of 2003, according to the International Institute
of Strategic Studies, North Korea’s defense budget
consumed some 25 percent of central government
spending.30 In the mid-1970s and early 1980s, according
to figures released by the U.S. Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency, between 32 and 38 percent
of central government expenditures went towards
defense.31 Moreover, one economic expert estimates
that between 20 and 40 percent of North Korea’s
economic output is produced by the KPA.32
The MIC has its origins some half century ago,
in the aftermath of the Korean War (what the DPRK
officially calls the “Fatherland Liberation War”), when
Pyongyang struggled to make itself self-sufficient in
armaments production through the development of
an indigenous defense industry. The outputs include
artillery, munitions, missiles, etc. Moreover, production
is not just to satisfy North Korea’s own defense needs
but for export to earn hard currency. For example,
over the years, North Korea has been one of the
leading proliferators of ballistic missiles.33 In addition,
the KPA is believed to manage the illegal production



and export of counterfeit brand name cigarettes and
pharmaceuticals, counterfeit foreign currencies, and
illicit narcotics.34
Control and Command. North Korea is a totalitarian,
cult-centered, nepotistic, and crony-dominated regime
that focuses on the interests of its elite rather than
national interests.35 While the regime is eroding, it still
is ruled by an all-powerful dictator who exerts strict
control over his regime and the North Korean people.
The populace lives in a condition of terror under the
thumb of an extremely repressive coercive apparatus
with a centralized economy, and the regime exerts
almost a total monopoly over mass communication.36
Thus, it might be better to rank control before
command.
All political, governmental, and military control
within North Korea begins with Kim Jong Il, who is
simultaneously Chairman of the NDC (the NDC also
is Kim Jong Il’s wartime command vehicle), General
Secretary of the KWP, and Supreme Commander
of the KPA (a unified armed force consisting of the
ground, navy, and air forces).37 The effectiveness of this
control and command to support high tempo warfare,
combined arms, or combined operations is suspect. As
the NDC Chairman and supreme commander of the
KPA, Kim Jong Il directly controls the military.38
By elevating the status of the NDC in 1998, Kim Jong
Il harnessed the expertise within the senior leadership
critical to national security decisionmaking. Under Kim
Il Sung, control and command of the armed forces was
exercised through the KWP. The information flow was
directly through the chain of command: the KPA to
the Central Military Committee (CMC) to Kim Il Sung.
With the restructuring of the regime in 1998, Kim Jong
Il has engineered a more direct relationship with the
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military. Information travels through various channels
from the KPA and security forces directly to Kim’s
office via his personal secretariat. This gives the high
command several avenues through which to gauge
Kim’s thinking on a particular issue and then exert
influence, while allowing Kim to detect if someone in
the chain is hiding or altering information.39
The NDC was designated a separate organization in
the 1992 revision of the constitution, and under the 1998
constitutional revision, the NDC became the primary
organ of power in the state, to which other branches
of power are now subordinate.40 It is an independent
entity in charge of overall decisionmaking and
guidance for defense projects, with the MPAF under
its control.41 Figure 2 provides one view of the lines of
power, influence, and control during peacetime. The
NDC and, more importantly, the Supreme Commander
(Kim Jong Il) has the power to declare war, issue
mobilization orders in an emergency, promote senior
military officers, and guide the armed forces and
defense construction work.42
The NDC membership also is unique in that its
membership does not appear to be linked to ceremony,
but the members of this commission are there
because they have a particular competency or have a
responsibility for a critical security-related portfolio.43
The CMC (of the KWP) is next in order of seniority
and guides development and production of munitions
and has command and control over North Korea’s
armed forces, that is, the day-to-day running of the
military.44 Since the 1998 restructuring and the elevation
of the NDC, the CMC no longer plays a vigorous role
in military policy.45 Nevertheless, the CMC plays an
important role on three levels: (1) propagates the party
line on military policy; (2) is critical to regime security
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Figure 2. Information, Influence, and Coordination
Within the North Korean Leadership Structure.

Source: Used courtesy of Ken Gause, Director of the Foreign Leadership Studies program, CNA Corporation, Alexandria, VA.

in that it is populated with essential personnel and
plays a role in power politics within the regime; and (3)
on the policy side, it ensures that the KWP apparatus
fulfills its defense-related responsibilities.46
North Korea employs a highly inflexible Sovietstyle military doctrine which emphasizes decisions
being made at the top and carefully scripted war
plans (which no one outside of North Korea has seen),
discouraging operational flexibility and initiative.47
Hence, we deliberately list control before command.
Minister of People’s Armed Forces (MPAF). The MPAF
is responsible for management and operational control
of the armed forces. Prior to 1992, it was under the direct
control of the president, with guidance from the NDC
and the KWP Military Affairs Department. The 1992
state constitution shifted its control to the NDC.48 The
minister of the PAF officially comes next in the chain
of command of North Korea’s armed forces after the
NDC, but his office has no control over policymaking
or decisionmaking in the KPA.49 See Figure 3 for this
peacetime command and control structure.
The MPAF, in peacetime, has responsibility for
matters such as the procurement of weapons, defense
research and development, intelligence-gathering, and
military training. Foreign exchanges and liaison is the
province of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.50 The armed
forces have little input into this area, although they
are consulted. Even when direct military talks occur
between North Korea and another state, the military
participants are closely briefed as to what they may
say by the KWP hierarchy.51
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Figure 3. North Korean Military Command
and Control.
North Korea’s military structure combines
elements of those of China and the former Soviet
Union, with the General Staff organizationally under
the command of MPAF; functionally, however, the
two are separated.52 In peacetime, MPAF takes charge
of military administration, while the General Staff
is responsible for operational command. During
wartime, the Supreme Commander would exercise
both military administration and operational control
directly through the General Staff, bypassing MPAF.
This dual chain of command ensures that only Kim
Jong Il in his capacity as Supreme Commander is able
to take the military command at anytime, regardless of
peacetime or wartime.53
MPAF has a single command system: the Chief of
the General Staff has direct command over the Ground
Forces corps (artillery corps, tank corps, and light
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infantry), the Naval command and the Air Defense
command.54 In order that no high-ranking military
officer can conspire with another to topple Kim Jong
Il, the present structure forces each one to stand alone
and to take control and punishment from the supreme
commander.55
To ensure political control, a secondary control
and command path extends down via a separate
chain-of-command to the lowest-levels of the KPA.56
The General Staff’s Department’s Operations Bureau
is responsible for all operational aspects of the KPA,
including broad-spectrum planning for the Air Force
and the Navy, as well as paramilitary units.57 It is in
direct contact with KPA Supreme Commander Kim
Jong Il, and in the event of emergency, Kim can bypass
the chain of command and issue orders directly to the
Operations Bureau.58
Two secondary paths exist to ensure political control
of the KPA. The first extends through the KWP Central
Committee to the Central Military Committee and to
the General Political Bureau subordinate to the NDC.
From the General Political Bureau, it extends down
via a separate chain-of-command to the lowest levels
of the KPA. The second extends from the NDC to the
State Security Department. This department controls
the MPAF’s Security Command, which also maintains
representatives to the lowest-level of the KPA.59
If North Korea exercised its mandate of unifying
the peninsula under the military option, the MPAF
probably would establish two or three army commands
to control corps combat operations. These army
commands could be responsible for East Coast, West
Coast, and Central offensive operations crossing over
the DMZ.60
MPAF has been relegated to managing the
peacetime administrative and logistic functions of the
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KPA, while the NDC is the wartime command and the
General Staff Department probably would run the war,
all lead by Kim Jong Il.
WMD Weapon Control and Command. Information
concerning the specific control and command of WMD
is vague and unclear due to the newness of this aspect
of the KPA. The control and command of chemical and
nuclear weapon usage probably falls directly under of
Kim Jong Il for the initial application of these weapons
through the General Staff of MPAF. Subordinate to the
General Staff is the Nuclear-Chemical Defense Bureau,
which is responsible for nuclear, biological, and
chemical weapons (NBC) defense within the KPA and
the production, distribution, and storage of chemical
weapons and defensive equipment.61
North Korea’s military control, command, and
communications system consists of extensive hardened
wartime command facilities, fiber-optic cable, and
digital switching stations. This network is supported
by redundant communication systems, which are
believed to be largely separate from systems supporting
other sectors of North Korea such as industry and
government.62
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II. CONVENTIONAL FORCES
Origins and Evolution. The 20th century history of
Korea is essential to understanding North Korea’s
national objectives. Until the end of World War II in
1945, Korea remained a single, ethnically and culturally
homogenous—but not independent—country for
over 1,000 years.63 Korea initially was divided on a
“temporary” basis by the United States and the Soviet
Union along the 38th parallel to facilitate the surrender
and demobilization of occupying Japanese forces in
Korea.64 The separation of the Koreas resulted in a split
between communism and democracy/capitalism,
both tempered by fighting the injustices from the
colonization of Korea by the Japanese.
The origins of the KPA are a fusion of Koreans
fighting in China for the Chinese Revolution and
against Japanese aggression (Yanan faction); the
Koreans fighting the Japanese in Manchuria under
the control of the Soviets (Kaspan faction);65 and the
Koreans fighting Japanese colonialism on the Korean
peninsula as well as each other for control in Korea
after the Korean War.
The birth of the KPA can be established probably
in 1936 when the Korean Fatherland Restoration
Association (KFRA) was established to create a united
front organization of anti-Japanese Koreans operating
in Manchuria.66 On June 4, 1937, Kim Il Sung led a small
group of partisans subordinate to the KFRA on a raid
against a small border village in Korea and defeated
a small Japanese police detachment. This muchcelebrated victory subsequently became the source of
the Kaspan faction’s name and the beginning of Kim Il
Sung’s legendary military career.67
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In 1939, the Korean Volunteer Army (KVA) was
formed in Yanan, China, to support Mao Zedong and
fought with the Chinese Communist forces in World
War II and the Chinese Revolution.68 In April 1946, the
KVA was absorbed by various area commands which
ultimately evolved into the newly forming Korean
Peace Preservation Corps moving into northern Korea.
Eventually, even this Corps was diluted by further
officer transfers and reorganizations and eventually
passed out of existence. However, the legacy and
history of the KVA continued to be used probably for
security and morale reasons. 69
In 1942, Kim Il Sung commanded a company of the
Soviet Far East Command’s Reconnaissance Bureau’s
88th Special Independent Sniper Brigade and received
a significant amount of training and experience in his
future development of special purpose forces for the
KPA.70
The KPA was established formally by Kim Il Sung
on February 8, 1948, the day after the Fourth Session
of the (NK) People’s Assembly agreed to separate the
roles of the military and those of the police.71 The origin
of the KPA certainly is rooted in the anti-Japanese
guerrilla armies in general that operated under Soviet
and Chinese military control. For 30 years, the KPA
commemorated its birth on February 8. Then in 1978,
North Korea changed the commemoration date to April
25 to correspond with the date in 1932 that Kim Il Sung
allegedly organized his Anti-Japanese Guerrilla Army.72
By this act, Kim Il Sung was extolling the Korean-ness
of the KPA, while dismissing the combined influences
of the Soviets and the Chinese Communists upon the
establishment of the KPA.73
Just after World War II and during the Soviet
Union’s occupation of the portion of Korea north of
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the 38th Parallel, the Soviet 25th Army Headquarters
in Pyongyang issued a statement ordering all (North
Korean) armed resistance groups in the northern part
of the peninsula to disband on October 12, 1945.74
Two thousand Koreans were allowed to briefly
enter into Korea but were returned to Manchuria. There
were several possible reasons as to why these Koreans
were not allowed to stay in Korea. The Soviets may
have been concerned with sending a trained armed
force into a country it would occupy, possibly giving
the Soviets trouble regarding insurgency. Many of
these Korean soldiers actually had lived in Manchuria
and were just returning to their homes. Finally, most
of these soldiers actually were raw recruits and, rather
than repatriating them, perhaps they were encouraged
to return to the Chinese Eighth Route Army so that,
after a period of seasoning, they might return to Korea
to become a core element in the nation’s future armed
forces.75
Two thousand Koreans with previous experience
in the Soviet army were sent to various locations
around the country to organize constabulary forces
with permission from Soviet military headquarters,
and the force was created on October 21, 1945.76 The
Headquarters activated a separate unit for railway
security on August 15, 1945, to supervise existing
security forces and to create the national armed forces.77
After the North Korean military was organized with
facilities to educate its new recruits, the Constabulary
Discipline Corps was reorganized into the North
Korean People’s Army Corps Headquarters.78
The State Security Department, a forerunner to
MPAF, was established as part of the Interim People’s
Committee on February 4, 1948, with the formal
creation of the KPA being announced on February 8,
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seven months before the government of the DPRK was
proclaimed on September 9, 1948.79 In accordance with
Kim Il Sung’s stated aspirations to “build a powerful
modern military,” the task continued in earnest, as the
army’s first tank unit—the 105th Armored Battalion—
was established.80 With the growth of the military to
some 60,000 troops, the KPA Headquarters created
two additional ground divisions.81
In 1949, after the Chinese Communist Forces
(CCF) took control of China, the CCF released tens of
thousands of combat-hardened ethnic Koreans from
the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) for duty with the
KPA.82
In 1950, KPA was a well-trained and modern force,
carefully constructed along Soviet lines. For over 2
years, hundreds of Soviet advisers had molded the
army. The Russians also had generously supplied
it with arms. Each KPA division, for example, was
equipped with 12 122mm howitzers, 24 76mm guns,
and 12 45mm antitank guns.83 All were recent World
War II vintage. The Soviets also provided the KPA
with tanks. Each infantry division had organic tanks,
and there was also a separate tank division. The 105th
Armored Division boasted 120 modern T-34 main
battle tanks.84
The Korean War provided the KPA with some
lessons learned that they have attempted to correct to
this day. First, they fully understand the value of the
intervention by the United States. History shows that
had the United States not intervened, success for the
KPA would have been virtually assured.85
Critical defects concerning the KPA were identified:
(1) the KPA’s infantry-centric organization was
unsuited to the Soviet’s armored/mechanized infantry
doctrine (attributed by the KPA as the primary cause
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of its failures); (2) its strategic plan was inadequately
developed to destroy its opponent; (3) its cadre was
poorly trained in military doctrine and tactics; (4)
its reserve forces were sparsely fielded; and (5) its
logistical system was insufficient to supply the army’s
needs.86 Further weaknesses included leaders who
were inadequately versed in strategy and tactics and
operational/tactical inefficacy.87
By 1960, ground forces may have totaled fewer than
400,000 persons and probably did not rise much above
that figure before 1972.88
KPA Modernization and Reorganization. Beginning in
the late 1970s, North Korea began a major reorganization
and modernization of its ground forces. This was
probably a reflection of the lessons learned (sudden
attack, quick victory, and role of a guerrilla struggle to
supplant conventional capabilities) from observing the
Vietnam War and other regional conflicts such as the
Arab-Israeli wars.89
During the 1980s, doctrine and organization were
revamped to increase the lethality, speed, and combat
power of the attack. The shifting of the majority of the
North Korean ground forces closer to the DMZ offered
the potential for a more rapid advance and minimizing
the time of detection of intent. The reorganization of
Pyongyang’s exploitation forces in the 1980s suggested
that initial attacking forces will be reinforced by heavier
and more mobile units to exploit any breakthroughs.90
The KPA was not uniformly successful in its 1980s
efforts to modernize its forces in support of a high-speed
offensive strategy; more needs to be done to update the
army’s mobility, artillery, and air defense elements.
North Korea increased its tank fleet, but incomplete
information suggested that it remained based largely
on dated Soviet technology with retrofitted indigenous
improvements.
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KPA artillery systems appeared to have made
the most of the limited technological base. The KPA
increased the artillery force while maintaining relative
quantitative and range superiorities over its potential
southern adversary and improving force mobility.
The technological level of Pyongyang’s industrial base
appeared to ensure that, with the possible exception of
narrow areas of special interest, built-in obsolescence
will be unavoidable, regardless of how undesirable.
Pyongyang appeared to be quantitatively increasing
the amount of systems with larger caliber weapons but
qualitatively, these weapons did not include modern
evolutionary advances such as computerized targeting,
radar guided munitions, etc.
Between 1984 and 1992, the army added about
1,000 tanks, over 2,500 APC/infantry fighting vehicles,
and about 6,000 artillery tubes or rocket launchers.91
In 1992 North Korea had about twice the advantage in
numbers of tanks and artillery, and a 1.5-to-1 advantage
in personnel over its potential adversaries, the U.S.Republic of Korea defenses to the south.92
By 1996, KPA major combat units consisted of
153 divisions and brigades, including 60 infantry
divisions/brigades, 25 mechanized infantry brigades,
13 tank brigades, 25 Special Operations Force (SOF)
brigades, and 30 artillery brigades. North Korea
deployed 10 corps, including 60 divisions and brigades
in the forward area south of the Pyongyang-Wonsan
line. The KPA ground forces were composed of 20
corps commands, including four mechanized and two
artillery corps, as well as a Tank Instruction Guidance
Bureau and an Artillery Command, Reconnaissance
Bureau, and one Light Infantry Training and Guidance
Bureau (formerly the VIII Special Corps controlling the
SOF).93
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Figure 4 reflects the disposition of the KPA Corps
along the DMZ and other military units throughout the
country. Although it is difficult to know North Korea’s
precise intentions or aspirations, by 2004 its forces were
deployed along the DMZ in such a manner that they
could support an invasion of South Korea. In particular,
the percentage of North Korean forces deployed
within 100km of the DMZ has increased significantly
during the past 2 decades, with approximately 70
percent of its military units, and up to 80 percent of
its estimated aggregate firepower, within 100km of the
DMZ. With these forward deployments, North Korea
theoretically could invade the South without recourse
to further deployments and with relatively little
warning time.94 The KPA continued to modernize its
military as North Korea announced an annual defense
budget of 15.5 percent of the government budget, or
about 30 percent of its gross national product (GNP).95
Reportedly because of fiscal constraints, North Korea
seeks to increase its development and procurement
of asymmetric weapons systems including missiles,
chemical, and biological munitions—and continue its
development of nuclear weapons.96
By 2006, North Korea’s asymmetric or unconventional warfare programs (SOF, WMD, etc.) measurably
contributed to the country’s security from external
threats and complemented its conventional military
capabilities. The continued conventional force improvement and asymmetric capability acquisition provided
a measured balance to offset capability deficiencies
and poor readiness while attempting to satisfy North
Korean military strategy requirements.
NK National Security Strategy. North Korea appears
to have two primary strategic goals or objectives: (1) the
perpetuation of the regime, and (2) reunification of the
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Source: Gause, North Korean Civil-Military Trends, September 2006,
p. 36.

Figure 4. KPA Military Disposition.
Fatherland (Korean peninsula) under North Korea’s
control.97 The first is really noncontroversial, although
analysts quibble about the precise terminology. The
second is more controversial, and specialists disagree.98
However, there are good reasons for concluding that
reunification by force has not been ruled out as a
regime goal by Pyongyang.
North Korea’s constitution describes reunification
as “the supreme national task.”99 The current North
Korean constitution was adopted in 1972; it was revised
in 1992 and again in 1998. The paramount importance
of reunification is a central theme in this version
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of the document, as well as the first North Korean
constitution adopted at the founding of the regime in
1948. The preamble to the charter of the [North] KWP
declares that “the present task of the Party is to ensure
the complete victory of socialism in the DPRK and the
accomplishment of the revolutionary goals of national
liberation and the people’s democracy in the entire
area of the country.”100
This supreme national task should never be
forgotten, as it permeates the entire foundation of North
Korea’s strategy and doctrine. North Korean media
always has held that the North Korean military is for
defensive purposes (defense against foreign invasion
by “imperialist aggressors and their lackey running
dogs” [i.e., the United States and South Korea]).101
This defensive argument is reinforced by North
Korea’s supposed fear that the United States will use the
Bush Doctrine of 2002 to conduct a preemptive strike
against North Korea’s nuclear facilities. However, as
Homer T. Hodge explains, the North Korean leaders
view the southern half of their country as occupied by
“U.S. Imperialists,” and “defense” does not refer to
defending North Korea but defending the entire Korean
peninsula. Moreover, when Pyongyang officials speak
of “peaceful reunification,” their conception of what
this entails may be rather different from that of their
counterparts in Seoul, Washington, and elsewhere.
The Swedish ambassador to Pyongyang recalls being
amazed at the terminology employed by a DPRK
official in 1975 when the official congratulated North
Vietnam for its victory over South Vietnam at a state
banquet. The speaker commended Hanoi “on achieving
the peaceful unification of Vietnam.”102
North Korea continues to pursue and develop
offensive-oriented weapons such as ballistic missiles,
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nuclear weapons, and submarines. Reunification
through force of arms appears to remain possible to
Kim Jong Il.103
One should not forget that Kim Il Sung attempted
to militarily reunify the Korean Peninsula in 1950 with
his invasion (characterized by North Korea as the
“Fatherland Liberation War”) into South Korea. Some
scholars like to characterize this conflict as a proxy
war between the two superpowers. However, as Bruce
Cumings and other historians have observed, it was
Kim Il Sung who planned and led this civil war.104
Three Revolutionary Forces. Having failed to reunify
the peninsula by purely military action, Kim Il Sung
recognized the need to combine political and diplomatic
efforts with an offensive military strategy. In 1960, Kim
Il Sung articulated a “Three Fronts (Revolutionary
Forces)” national strategy.105 These revolutionary forces
referred to those revolutionary forces in the north, in
the south and the international community necessary
for the reunification of Korea and were later redefined
as three phases of war. The north revolutionary forces
meant “the transformation of the Military Might,”
southern revolutionary forces as the erosion of the
South Korean alliance with the United States, and
the international revolutionary forces would be the
diplomatic war to increase support for Pyongyang and
isolate Seoul.106
In 1962, the Fifth Plenum of the KWP Central
Committee adopted a three-phase plan to employ
both conventional and unconventional means to
affect reunification: (1) create a military-industrial
base in North Korea; (2) neutralize the United
States by subverting and destroying the U.S.-South
Korea alliance; and (3) liberate South Korea through
employment of insurgency and conventional force.107
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Despite a period of increased tension, violent
clashes, and much bloodshed during 1966-69, the
North Korean military strategy ultimately failed to
achieve its goals of breaking the U.S.-South Korean
alliance or creating an armed revolution in South
Korea. However, Pyongyang’s strategic objective of
reunification remained unchanged, and by the 1970s,
North Korean leaders modified their military strategy
to adopt a more conventional approach.108
A long history of bloody incursions into South
Korea underscores the offensive mission of the KPA. It
is important to note that from 1954 to 1992, North Korea
is reported to have infiltrated a total of 3,693 armed
agents into South Korea. Not counting North Korea’s
invasion of South Korea that triggered the Korean War
(1950-53) North Korea’s major terrorist involvement
includes: attempted assassinations of ROK President
Park Chung Hee in 1968 and 1974; a 1983 attempt on
ROK President Chun Doo Hwan’s life in a bombing
incident in Rangoon, Burma (Myanmar); and a midair sabotage bombing of a South Korean Boeing 707
passenger plane in 1987.
Provocations have continued intermittently up to
2003 in the form of armed incursions, kidnappings,
and occasional as well as regular conventional threats
to turn the South Korean capital of Seoul into “a sea
of fire” and to silence or tame South Korean critics of
North Korea.109
By 2003, according to USFK estimates, there had
been 1,439 major provocations and DMZ violations
since 1953 with 90 U.S. troops killed in action (KIA),
over 390 ROK KIA (to include six Republic of Korea
[ROK] Navy seaman killed by an unprovoked attack
by North Korea in June 2002); and 889 North Korean
KIA.110 These are not acts that one would expect from
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a country concerned with defense but rather with
implementing an offensive national military strategy.
Military-First Doctrine. Militarism has remained an
essential aspect of the character of North Korea since
its founding in 1948 and constitutes a key element
of the strategic culture of the government.111 North
Korean military doctrine further evolved from an
element of national power to coexist as an element of
political power. On March 21, 2003, Nodong Sinmun112
published a special article "Military-First Ideology Is
an Ever-Victorious, Invincible Banner for Our Era’s
Cause of Independence," which declared that the KPA
is the basis of North Korea’s political revolutionary
strategy.113
The character of the KPA high command has changed
since Kim Jong Il came to power. While members of
the first (partisan) generation still hold posts of power,
the day-to-day management of the military has begun
to shift to second (senior officers in their 60s) and third
generations. The era of a single senior military figure
tied closely to the party and the Great Leader has been
replaced by a system in which control with the KPA is
more dispersed, and many channels lead back to Kim
Jong Il. In this way, Kim has been able to secure his
control over the military, a goal that is ultimately at
the heart of “military-first politics.”114 Third generation
will serve to protect Kim Jong Il but may also ultimately
become his biggest political threat. This strategy "calls
for giving priority to military issues over everything,
and it is a line, strategy, and tactics of putting the KPA
before the working class" to the point that the KPA is
"the most pivotal (political) group" in North Korean
society.115
North Korea’s military-first policy is ever-present
and plays many multidimensional roles as an
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important economic actor in agriculture, infrastructure
construction, research and development, professional
education, weapons sales, and hard currency earning.
It is the major ideological educator, socializer of the
youth, and general backbone of the society.116
Finally, this policy is the principal veto power in all
policy deliberations, let alone as the military defender
of the nation and the principal guarantor of the regime
survival. To begin economic reforms with North Korea,
the policy was driven by the pure self-preservation
instinct, not based on Marxist-Leninist ideology.
Without the support of the top military leaders,
Kim Jong Il alone could not have made a strategic
decision to conduct what one of the authors has
dubbed economic “reform around the edges.”117 What
seems to be important is that the KPA was elevated to
be the primary actor in the country whereas the more
conservative KWP was relegated to be the secondary
actor in restructuring the North Korean state and
building a “great powerful and prosperous nation.”118
One of the hallmarks of the Kim Jong Il era has
been the evolution of power away from the KWP and
toward the KPA.119 In the wake of the revision of the
1998 constitution, there was a dramatic reshuffling of
the official leadership rankings with members of the
NDC beginning to overtake Politburo and Secretariat
members.120
Moreover, the principal reason why some foreign
observers do not believe that the economic reforms
undertaken by North Korea represent a fundamental
transformation in Pyongyang’s thinking is precisely
the military-first policy, the dominant role that the KPA
still plays in the North Korean decisionmaking process,
and the belief that the military-first policy precludes any
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constructive resolution in major diplomatic overtures
such as the nuclear negotiations.121
Military Doctrine. KPA military doctrine began as
a hybridization of Chinese and Soviet concepts. North
Korean military doctrine further evolved from lessons
learned from global confrontations such as the ArabIsraeli conflicts, the Vietnam War, Kosovo, Operation
DESERT STORM, and more recently, Operation IRAQI
FREEDOM.
Throughout the last 70 years, North Korea’s military
has learned that it cannot necessarily depend on China
or Russia to be there to assist with its development and
operations. Although China and Russia provide some
support today, they appear to support North Korea as
a counterbalance to the U.S. presence in South Korea.
This is another primary tenet of the Juche ideology
of self-sufficiency that North Korea has developed
regarding all phases of its military from doctrine
development to weapons and ammunition production.
This doctrine has evolved through as many as four
stages since the founding of the KPA in February
1948. North Korean military writings derive from
Marxism-Leninism through the conduit of "Kim Il
Sung Thought." Kim Il Sung is credited with virtually
everything in North Korean military thought, from
Lenin’s reformulation of Clausewitz’ classic definition
of war to basic squad tactics.122 Reportedly, Kim Jong
Il also is putting his name to several documents which
credit him with military doctrine formulation.
North Korean military thinking began as a mixture
of Soviet strategic and Chinese tactical influences
tempered by guerrilla warfare.123 From 1951 to
December 1962, North Korean military orthodoxy
was a conventional warfare doctrine based on Soviet
military doctrine and operational art modified on the
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basis of the Korean War experience.124 Soviet Stalinist
factors that determine the course and outcome of war
were incorporated directly into North Korean military
doctrine.125
In 1962, North Korea’s confidence in the Soviet
Union was severely degraded after it witnessed the
Soviet acquiescence to the United States during the
Cuban Missile Crisis.126 The Soviet Union voted in
December 1962 to suspend military and economic
assistance to the DPRK because of ideological
differences.127 Kim Il Sung realized that North Korea’s
hopes of stalwart Soviet support for any North Korean
military endeavors would be minimal unless it served
the well-being of the Soviet Union. Of course, Kim
should have learned this from Stalin during World
War II and the Korean War.
Thus, North Korean military doctrine shifted
dramatically away from the doctrine of regular warfare
to a doctrine that embraced people’s war. Kim Il Sung
espoused the Four Military (guide) Lines: (1) to arm
the entire population; (2) to fortify the entire country;
(3) to train the entire army as a "cadre army"; and (4) to
modernize weaponry, doctrine, and tactics under the
principle of Juche in national defense.128 The adoption
of this military line signaled a shift from a Sovietstyle strategy to a Maoist protracted war of attrition.
Conventional warfare strategy was incorporated into
and subordinated to the overall concept of the people’s
war concept with the mobilization of the entire country
through reinforcement of ideological training.129
In 1965-67, Soviet military assistance was
reinstated which allowed for the KPA to resume a
delayed modernization program. In 1966, North Korea
determined that a peaceful reunification of the Korean
peninsula could not be attained without active guerrilla
action in South Korea. Kim Il Sung announced the
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abandonment of the policy of seeking to unify Korea
by peaceful means and the adoption of a new, more
militant policy toward South Korea. 130
Combined Operations and “Two-Front War.” Kim’s
speech formed the basis of two new doctrines,
“combined operations” and “two-front war.” The
combined operations doctrine called for the integration
of guerrilla warfare operations with conventional KPA
ground force operations. The two-front war doctrine
called for close coordination of conventional frontline
operations with guerrilla and special operations deep
within South Korea.131
In the early 1970s, the Soviet-trained officers of the
KPA were developing the “Two Front War.” As they
envisioned it, a very large conventional force—greatly
reinforced with artillery, armor, and mechanized
forces, employing surprise attack, speed, and a short
violent campaign—would break through the DMZ,
envelop and destroy South Korean forward forces, and
rapidly overrun the entire peninsula. This operation
would be facilitated by a second front composed of SOF
infiltrated deep into the South Korean strategic rear to
destroy, neutralize, or disrupt South Korean and U.S. air
operations; command, control, and communications;
and lines of communications. Throughout the 1970s, in
the first of a two-phased force expansion plan, North
Korea emphasized the commitment of scarce resources,
development of industry, and military expansion and
reorganization necessary to create such a force.132
However, as time moved on, North Korea’s
ability to conduct such a dual operation successfully
becomes less and less viable. South Korean acquisition
of military hardware (both quality and modern),
significantly improved weapon and sensor technology,
and urbanization, coupled with presence of U.S. forces,
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precision munitions, counter-battery fire, and bunkerbusting bombs has diminished North Korea’s chances
of a military reunification with control under Kim Jong
Il.133
However, possibly to counter this, North Korea is
developing asymmetric capabilities with its SOF and
WMD (discussed later). There are no indications that
North Korea does not intend to fully commit itself
to occupying the peninsula, all the way to Pusan.
Thus, North Korea may have reversed the roles of the
massive conventional forces along the DMZ and the
Second Front Special Purpose forces.
The 70 percent of the KPA forces massed along the
DMZ may be a feint to “fix” South Korean forces along
the Forward Edge of the Battle Area (FEBA), while
the SOF conducts its unconventional and guerrilla
operations in the South. Only when North Korea deems
the time right would expected conventional attacks by
KPA ground forces over the DMZ occur. These forces
also would have to secure South Korean logistics to
sustain the main effort since North Korea’s ability to
do this is suspect. North Korea would not commit its
main effort if Kim Jong Il did not feel it would win a
total victory. However, North Korean miscalculations
could lead to a failed offensive into South Korea which
could result in a limited option plan for North Korea.
Lessons learned from the Vietnam War and the
Arab-Israeli War of 1967 served as the foundation for
the establishment of the KPA’s three pillared military
strategy—surprise attack, quick decisive war, and
mixed tactics.134 North Korea observed that during
the Vietnam War, North Vietnam was able to counter
a technologically superior force successfully, using
aspects of special operations forces and psychological
operations.135 The shift supplied the doctrinal basis
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for North Korea’s strategy of covert infiltrations into
South Korea, assassinations, and attempts at fostering
insurgencies in South Korea during the late 1960s.136
The 1966-69 period was characterized as a period of
low-intensity conflict as scenes from an unfinished
war.137
During the 1970s, Soviet military thinking continued
to dominate KPA strategy and doctrine development,
especially the nature of modern warfare. This new
concept adopted a three-dimensional aspect, with no
distinction between front and rear, highly mobile, and
increasingly dependent upon mechanization, task
organization, and improved engineer capabilities.138
During 1972, doctrine and strategy were refined
further as “enabling North Korean forces to smash the
enemy strategically and tactically by either integrating
or combining the following: large unit and small unit
operations;139 the experiences of the guerrilla units and
modern military technology; guerrilla and modern war
tactics; strong guerrilla activities and national popular
resistance.”140 Kim Il Sung understood the power of
insurgency as a lesson learned from the Vietnam war,
and this probably has been reinforced by Kim Jong
Il per observations of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.
Although the U.S. Intelligence Community has been
concentrating on its analysis of SOF in recent years,
often the enormity of the conventional KPA receives the
emphasis of operational planning while the guerrilla
or unconventional warfare aspect of North Korean
military doctrine is overlooked.
Beginning in the early 1980s, North Korea began
execution of its force expansion and reorganization
plan. The ground forces had increased from 720,000
in 1980 to 950,000 by 1994. Forward-deployed forces
(those within 100km, or about 60 miles, of the DMZ)
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had increased from 40 percent to 70 percent of total
troop strength.141
Eventually, the primacy of conventional warfare
again became doctrine which conceptualized and
influenced North Korean operational art in the early
1990s; particularly influential are the concepts that
emphasize the importance of operational and tactical
mobility through the employment of mechanized
forces, of firepower throughout the depth of the
battlefield (North Korea designed and produced the
170mm gun, battle tested in the Iran/Iraq war, and
the 240mm multiple rocket launcher to provide the
KPA with a deep strike capability, which the North
Korean Air Force does not provide), of deep strikes,
and of command and control. Kim also stressed that
each operational plan and campaign should aim at a
lightning war for a quick decision.142
Fall of the Soviet Union. The end of communist
regimes in Eastern Europe and the collapse of the
Soviet Union left Pyongyang without any significant
ideological allies save China but also without essential
economic and military assistance. Beginning in 1990,
North Korea embarked on a comprehensive 5-year
program to prepare the nation for war without outside
assistance. This war preparation campaign was
much broader and more rigorous than any previous
effort. Improvement of the KPA’s capabilities was an
important element of this campaign, which included
reorganization, redeployment, and reinforcement,
as well as quantitative and qualitative increases in
training at all echelons.143
After analyzing the 1991 Gulf War, North Korea
increased its construction of underground facilities
(command and control sites, logistics to include
POL storage, military housing, and equipment such
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as artillery) to protect against the precision of U.S.
weaponry allowing for the assembly of KPA military
equipment and personnel in protected, underground
facilities. Today, North Korea possesses as many as
10,000 such facilities.144
North Korea has understood the importance of
hardening its facilities from the Korean experience in
World War II when Korean slave workers constructed
underground bunkers for the Japanese military,
including the Imperial Navy’s headquarters in Naha,
Okinawa.145 However, from the end of the Korean
War through Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, North
Korea has understood the operational and tactical
implications that its underground facilities provide
from countering adversarial intelligence surveillance
and reconnaissance (ISR) to minimizing the impact of
precision munitions.
The 1999 Kosovo War provided North Korea with
another opportunity to evaluate U.S. military operations
in an area with terrain and weather similar to that of
the Korean Peninsula, which included studying the
adverse effects that this terrain and weather had upon
the U.S. high-tech arsenal.146 Today, these doctrines and
strategies continue to be recalibrated to reflect changing
capabilities and weapon acquisition. While ROK and
U.S. analysts describe the KPA’s offensive strategy for
a war of reunification as “blitzkrieg (lightning war),”
the KPA represents its “two-front war” and “combined
operations” strategies somewhat differently. North
Korea will use a massive attack across the DMZ,
utilizing overwhelming firepower and violence known
as a “One Blow Non-stop Attack.”147 Concurrent with
this will be limited use of chemical weapons against
targets within the forward area; ballistic missile strikes
(some armed with chemical warheads) against ROK
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and U.S. airbases, ports, and C3I assets throughout the
ROK; operations by hundreds of SOF units; offensive
naval mine employment and intelligence agents
throughout the ROK creating a “second front;” and
special operations forces and intelligence agent attacks
against U.S. bases in Japan and Okinawa.148
This military strategy also relies heavily on a
surprise attack strategy which is very reminiscent of
Sun Tzu: attacking the enemy at an unexpected time
and place and by employing unexpected means, it
can maximize time, speed, and secrecy. This strategy,
coupled with an effective deception plan, is believed to
yield maximum effects with minimum efforts. North
Korean elements of its surprise attack include: (1)
utilizing inclement weather, hours of darkness, and
rugged terrain; (2) developing clever deception plans;
(3) employing skilled infiltration teams (or resident
sleeper agents); (4) conducting seaborne, air assault
and parachute operations; (5) setting mass fires (this
element of surprise allows for mine fields to be cleared
quickly in the DMZ area as well as creating a diversion
in an urban setting); (6) quickly concentrating the
effects of combat power at a decisive area;149 and (7)
employing large-scale mechanized units.150
Occupying South Korea, All the Way to Pusan.
The goals of this strategy are to move southward as
quickly as possible, surround Seoul, gaining control
of the ROK strategic rear area (especially airbases and
ports), preventing reinforcement of the peninsula by
U.S. and other allied forces, and inflicting as much
damage as possible upon U.S. forces. In 1992, Kim Jong
Il reportedly authored the plan as “Occupying South
Korea, All the Way to Pusan in Three Days.”151
The KPA leadership understands that, while it is
unrealistic to believe they can occupy the ROK in 3
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days, they do believe that if the political and military
conditions are favorable, the KPA can achieve this
goal within 3-4 weeks. The key has always been the
race between occupying the peninsula and U.S.
reinforcement/resupply.152 North Korea probably
observed between Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait and
the U.S.-led coalition counterattack, it took 5 1/2
months. However, the most important point to be
made is that Iraq invaded and occupied Kuwait in a
matter of hours. It took a U.S.-led coalition to win the
country back.
North Korean leaders remember and have attempted
to adapt to what they learned in 1950, that the United
States and its United Nations (UN) allies stabilized
the military situation on the Korean peninsula within
1 month after the KPA surprise attack, conducted a
complex amphibious landing in 2 1/2 months, and
conquered the enemy’s homeland in 4 months.153 North
Korea never totally controlled the entire peninsula.
North Korean leaders saw the demise of the Soviet
Union as primarily the result of Gorbachev’s “New
Thinking,” which included the shift of the Soviet
Union’s military strategy to “defensive defense.” A shift
similar in North Korea will not happen as long as North
Korea continues to maintain its strategic objectives of
reunification and regime survival. Pyongyang cannot
abandon its offensive military strategy.154
The Role of Special Purpose Forces (including SOF). A
dominant element of the KPA is its Special Purpose
Forces. Unconventional warfare and the various
aspects of North Korean military doctrine dictate the
utilization of these forces in all aspects of the KPA’s
doctrine and strategy. In any attempt to unify the
peninsula by military means, these forces probably
will be most critical in achieving success for the KPA.
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Since the 1960s, North Korea increasingly has
developed its SOF manpower (see Figure 5). These
forces, which include the KPA special operations
force (SOF), are the world’s largest, enjoy the highest
military funding priority for the regime, and are tough,
well-trained, and profoundly loyal.155 It is extremely
difficult to determine the actual manpower count for
SOF because of its nature. North Korea maintains
a formidable special purpose force between 88,000122,000 troops,156 with between 80,000 and 100,000
probably adjudged to be SOF. This significant increase
signals the probable intentions of North Korea to use
these forces in the fight for the rear area as the First
Front.
SOF
Personnel
Decades Strength
1960s
1,800
1970s
41,000
1980s
80,000
1990s
100,000
2000s
120,000
Note: Compiled by authors from various sources.

Figure 5. North Korean SOF Force Development.
The actual purpose for this large build-up of these
elite forces is unknown. However, these SOF probably
deal with the internal requirements of maintaining the
military-first policy and the external requirements.
North Korea’s special purpose forces are unique and
do not mirror-image Chinese or Russian forces.157
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The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) previously
has reported that these KPA special forces have welldeveloped skills of repelling, mountain climbing,
swimming, martial arts, airborne and amphibious
landing instruction, demolition, and rigorous physical
fitness that is complemented by their mental training
that includes individual initiative, creativity, flexibility,
and aggressiveness—similar to those associated with
elite units throughout the world.158
North Korean SOF fall into many different
categories: ranger/commando, light infantry, airborne,
sniper/strategic assassination, SEAL, reconnaissance,
amphibious assault/naval infantry/marine, agent
infiltration and intelligence operative. North Korean
SOF are associated with conventional warfare,
unrestricted warfare,159 unconventional warfare,160
guerrilla warfare,161 partisan warfare,162 asymmetric
warfare,163 and insurgency.164
Evolution of North Korean Special Purpose Forces. North
Korean Special Purpose Forces retain their roots and
history from Kim Il Sung’s first military experiences
and have evolved as KPA military doctrine has
evolved. Figure 5 shows the numerical development
of SOF manpower from the 1960s through the present.
In 1958, Kim Il Sung began to define the role of the
KPA’s emerging SOF when he issued his “Instruction
to Reconnaissance Troops.” His instructions included
training under every type of weather and seasonal
condition to include day and night physical training
in the mountains; arming themselves with solid party
ideology; being able to fight in the enemy’s rearguard;
acquiring the ability to destroy airfields, “atomic
guns” (probably a reference to perceived U.S. artillery
deployed in the South with a nuclear ordnance
capability—it does show North Korea’s awareness
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and targeting of such systems if they did exist),
bridges, tunnels, and locomotives; operating airplanes,
automobiles, and trains; operating ocean-going and
river ships and boats; and being adept swimmers.165
The early 1960s reflected a time of civil unrest and
military vulnerabilities in South Korea. Large student
uprisings forced the resignation of the Syngman Rhee
government and enabled the ROK military under
the leadership of Park Chung Hee to assume power
through a coup d’état. The DPRK’s failure to be
prepared and capable to exploit these vulnerabilities
resulted in reorganization and modernization of the
KPA which included intelligence gathering and North
Korea-sponsored anti-ROK operations.166
Between 1965 and 1968, the KPA developed the
light infantry regiment class of infantry units. This
regiment would receive training and equipment for its
new warfare missions. It consisted of approximately
1,300-1,800 troops, responsible for conducting guerrilla
warfare and special operations within the army group’s
area of responsibility.167
Throughout the late 1950s and early 1960s, the KPA
had only a limited amphibious warfare capability.
Most of the KPA maritime lift was conducted by
fishing boats, junks, sampans, and a few conventional
amphibious warfare craft. The North Koreans had a
history of using nontraditional methods to conduct
amphibious operations. For example, on June 25, 1950
a ROKN patrol craft sank a 1,000 ton armed North
Korean steamer with 600 KPA troops embarked,
attempting to land near Pusan. The significance of this
operation has been lost, since all the attention has been
given to North Korea’s offensive thrust down South
Korea’s main road along the east coast. If the 600 troops
had landed successfully near Pusan, the outcome of the
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war could have been drastically altered. This forgotten
operation reveals Kim Il Sung’s doctrine of using a rear
attack to support his main effort.168
Early in 1968, the DPRK once again revealed its
resolve to use its SOF to achieve its missions by using
a 31-man assault team to attempt to assassinate the
President of South Korea. It was believed that the
death of the President would result in civil unrest
allowing for the “revolution in the south” to begin
with KPA assistance. Dressed in ROK Army uniforms,
the North Korean SOF team infiltrated South Korea
through the DMZ. On January 21, 1968, the team
proceeded to the Presidential residence, the Blue
House, to kill the president and any other civilians
encountered. However, the team was discovered and
engaged by ROK National Police. All of the North
Korean commandos were killed, but two of the team
reportedly escaped back to North Korea without being
captured. Twenty-seven ROK personnel were killed,
with 65 ROK wounded. This act was eclipsed quickly
in U.S. thinking by the attack and capture of the USS
Pueblo two days later by the Korean People’s Navy and
Air Force units.169
VIII Special Corps. Because of the failures of this attack
and other large commando operations targeting South
Korea during the late 1960s, North Korea established
the VIII Special Corps.170 North Korean partisan
generals were purged, special warfare and intelligence
assets were reorganized, and policy was reformulated.
Rather than guerrilla warfare, political subversion,
with selected use of military special operations, now
became the policy to be pursued against South Korea.
This would be complemented by a dramatic increase in
support for “international revolution” and the struggle
against imperialism (i.e., revolution and terrorism) as
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an indirect means of striking at both the ROK and the
United States. In 1969, Kim Il Sung emphasized the
“study of combining regular and irregular warfare,
and of mountain warfare.” 171
Kim Il Sung stated that there would be a unique
strategic approach based upon “light infantry units,”
which had the capability of conducting “all forms of
combat.” This was a pivotal point in the development of
the KPA’s special warfare forces. Prior to this, guerrilla
warfare was the primary mission which received the
bulk of support and funding. Now these units would
be responsible for a broader, more balanced range
of unconventional and special warfare operations.
Prolonged political subversion and intelligence
collection became the primary mission.172 In 1970, SOF
personnel strength was estimated at 15,000. This figure
dramatically increased to 41,000 by 1978 and to 80,000
by 1984.173
Throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, DPRK
continued to conduct infiltration and special operations
against the ROK. These missions did not have the same
lethality that those in the 1960s had. KPA SOF utilized
overland but preferred seaborne insertion methods
such as using high-speed infiltration craft; however,
all attempted to exfiltrate via land through the DMZ.
By the late 1970s, the term “special purpose
forces” was coined to describe those KPA units that
possessed ranger/commando- and special forces-type
capabilities, as well as capabilities for unconventional
warfare and special operations.
From 1970 to 1980, at least six infiltration teams
were engaged and killed or destroyed. However, in
1974, Kim Il Sung still sent assassination teams to kill
ROK President Park Chung Hee, all failing in their
attempts (although they did kill Park’s wife). 174
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In 1982-83, North Korea implemented a series
of organizational changes which reorganized the
intelligence and internal security services and separated
MPAF from the State Administration Council and
placed it under the CMC (which later evolved into
the NDC). During this organization, programs to
mechanize and modernize the KPA as well as cultivate
the KPA’s special warfare assets, and the capabilities
of the Reconnaissance Bureau175 and VIII Special Corps
were developed and implemented.
In 1984-85, the KPAF acquired 87 Hughes MD500 Defender helicopters which were repainted with
ROKAF paint schemes. Thus reconfigured, these
helicopters would prove significantly useful in any
operations against the ROK.
In the 1980s, the KPA began to improve and increase
its airborne and seaborne lift capabilities. In 1987, KPA
amphibious warfare (which included new amphibious
doctrine and industrial production) began constructing
high-speed air-cushion landing craft (speeds up to 52
knots and carrying 40-50 troops) which significantly
improved the KPA’s amphibious assault capability,
especially into the ROK rear areas which have large
mud flats.176
During the early 1990s, the VIII Special Corps was
renamed the Light Infantry Training and Guidance
Bureau. The special purpose forces continued to expand
during this period from 85,000 troops organized into
22 brigades in 1990 to approximately 100,000 troops
organized into 25 brigades in 1996.
Foreign Military Assistance Using SOF Assets. From
1969-89, the DPRK expanded its foreign military
assistance to a number of developing countries
and to its support for terrorist and revolutionary
groups. Personnel from the VIII Special Corps and
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Reconnaissance Bureau provided the majority of the
advisors sent overseas on military assistance missions
and would serve as instructors and trainers to terrorist
and revolutionary groups both overseas and within
the DPRK. As late as 1995, the DPRK invited members
of the terrorist organization Abu Nidal to North
Korea and continued to support rebel groups in the
Philippines.177
Beginning in 1990, several organizational changes
occurred within the DPRK that enhanced Kim Jong Il’s
control over the KPA and affected both the VIII Special
Corps and the intelligence services. The first was the
establishment of the NDC and the transferring of
MPAF to the NDC. On December 24, 1991, Kim Jong Il
was appointed supreme commander of the KPA, and
1 year later, he was appointed chairman of the NDC.178
Because of Kim Jong Il’s moves, the death of Kim Il
Sung in 1994 had minimal observable effect on the
special forces or even the KPA in general.
SOF Missions. Today, KPA Special Purpose Forces
have evolved the following missions:
• Seizure or destruction of (enemy) strategic/
theater and global command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I), missile,
radar, and nuclear, biological, and chemical
(NBC) warfare assets.
• Interdiction, seizure, or control of strategic
targets (air bases, naval bases, port facilities,
POL facilities, lines of communications, and
nuclear power plants within [ROK] rear areas).
• Raids against U.S. Air Force and Navy bases
in Japan and Okinawa and conceivably against
military installations in Guam, Hawaii and the
continental United States.
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• Seizure of critically important topographic
features (mountain passes, tunnels, bridges,
etc.) and civilian facilities (railroads, highways,
airports, power plants, etc.).
• Interdiction, seizure, and control of ROK/U.S.
lines of communications, for the interdiction of
reinforcements and supplies for forces deployed
along the DMZ, and in advance of, or in support
of, regular ground force operations.
• Targeting for long-range artillery.
• Establishing intelligence networks in the ROK.
• Creating insurgency in the ROK, recruiting and
controlling insurgent forces (a Primary Second
Front Mission).
• Targeting reconnaissance for DPRK WMD (e.g.,
ballistic missiles and chemical weapons, and
possibly nuclear devices).
• Covert delivery of biological weapons.
• Assassination or abduction of ROK political
leaders and senior ROK/U.S. military commanders.
• Strategic reconnaissance and the provision of
timely and accurate intelligence to the General
Staff Department and corps commanders.
• Kidnapping and diversionary operations.179
• Establishing military and political intelligence
nets within the ROK and fostering the growth
of guerrilla forces.
• Military training to foreign governments,
revolutionary organizations, and terrorist
organizations.180
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• Military assistance, training, and internal
security for Kim’s inner circle (to include body
guards and palace guards),
• Assisting friendly governments and organizations (e.g., Nicaragua, Zimbabwe, PLO, and
Burundi).181
SOF forces can conduct operations at the strategic,
operational, and tactical levels. During offensive
operations, SOF reconnaissance units would conduct
penetration (into enemy territory) missions to collect
military intelligence and launch raids on military and
civilian targets. Prior to the main attack, some units
would infiltrate behind enemy lines by air and sea,
while others would cross into the ROK through tunnels
under the DMZ182 or along the mountain ridges.
The Special Purpose Forces Command is organized
into eight sniper brigades, with two amphibious
brigades and two airborne brigades; and 12 light
infantry brigades, with three airborne brigades, 17
reconnaissance battalions, one airborne battalion, and
eight Bureau of Reconnaissance SOF battalions.183
The only organization controlling SOF units is the
Reconnaissance Bureau and the Light Infantry Training
and Guidance Bureau (formerly the VIII Special Purpose
Corps).184 The Reconnaissance Bureau is composed
of five departments, a number of operational units
and reconnaissance brigades, and shares some of the
responsibility for training and dispatching espionage
and subversive agents to the south, with the Liaison
and Operations Departments. It maintains a training
center, the 907th Army Unit, to train South Korean
Army personnel who have been abducted, or have
defected to North Korea.185
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The Light Infantry Training Guidance Bureau
is the primary organization within the KPA tasked
with the training and conducting of unconventional
(asymmetric) and special warfare operations. During
peacetime, it is believed to exercise administrative
control over all special operations units, including those
of the North Korean Air Force and Navy (the Air Force
and Navy will be discussed below) and Reconnaissance
Bureau. During wartime, it will function as the primary
headquarters coordinating all special operations.186
The following example of a failed KPA Special
Purpose Forces operation reflects, in part, their mission
and capabilities:
• In 1996, a KPA Reconnaissance Bureau operation
failed when a KPN SANGO-class submarine187
ran aground off the east coast of the ROK during
the retrieval of a 26-man sniper brigade team.
Two members of this team successfully eluded
a massive (more than 16,000 ROK Army troops)
search and capture operation for 49 days before
being located and killed. A third sniper team
member eventually escaped back to the DPRK
across the DMZ. Twenty-three members of the
team and crew of the submarine accepted death
as more honorable than capture, indicative of the
KPA dedication and political indoctrination.188
This supreme dedication to their leadership and their
country is a very important element that must be
considered. The unconventional warfare (small unit)
aspect of North Korea’s offensive strategy is essential
to winning the decisive fight and to achieving victory.
KPA Conventional Capabilities. Measured by the
number of personnel in uniform, North Korea possesses
the world’s fourth largest military. But this ranking
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fails to capture the high level of militarization in the
DPRK. Most men and some women (approximately 10
percent of the KPA are women) between the ages of 17
and 25 serve legally for 42-48 months, but most stay
at least 10 years (for women, it is normally 6-8 years).
However, their commitment is then transferred from
active duty to a reserve, defense industry factory, or
security aspect of the government. 189
Ground. With approximately 1 million active-duty
troops, the KPA ground forces are the largest and
most formidable of the KPA’s components.190 The size,
organization, and combat capabilities of the ground
forces provide the DPRK with substantial defensive
and offensive capabilities.
The active-duty KPA ground forces are comprised
of 19 corps-level units including nine corps, four
mechanized corps, one tank corps, one artillery corps,
the Pyongyang Defense Command, Border Guard
Command, Missile Guidance Bureau and the Light
Infantry Instruction Guidance Bureau (previously
discussed).191
During the past 20 years the KPA has initiated a
comprehensive program involving the reorganization,
reequipping, and forward redeployment of ground
forces units, as well as the complete restructuring
and upgrading of reserve forces and the rear area
command structure. Notable improvements include
the reorganization of a number of motorized infantry
divisions and mechanized brigades into mechanized
corps, and the production and deployment of new tanks
and long-range self-propelled artillery systems.192
Today, the KPA is assessed to have an aggregate
of 3500 main battle tanks,193 6560 armored fighting
vehicles, and 10,400 field artillery (including multiplerocket launchers), as well as large array of air-defense
artillery systems (almost 16,000 pieces).194
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The KPA’s concept of “mechanization” is different
from that currently used by the ROK or U.S. military
forces. With regard to infantry forces, “mechanization”
is designed to provide rapid protected movement to
combat. The vast majority of the KPA’s mechanized
infantry forces will travel via trucks or armored personnel
carriers (APC), not infantry fighting vehicles. Once these
KPA units arrive at their destination, they will debark
and fight as conventional infantry. However, the KPA
has enhanced the mobility of its infantry forces and the
protection of its tanks, self-propelled artillery and selfpropelled anti-aircraft systems, not the acquisition of
large quantities of armored personnel carriers (APCs)
or infantry fighting vehicles. Thus, anywhere from
40-60 percent of any KPA mechanized infantry unit
actually is truck mobile.195
During the past 20 years, the KPA has attempted to
improve the organization and equipment of its ground
forces. This has been accomplished during a period of
deepening economic crisis which has limited access
to foreign equipment and precipitated fuel shortages,
and restricting training and operations.
Further complicating this effort has been a series of
natural disasters such as typhoons, floods, and famines
that have affected every aspect of life within the DPRK.
Despite preferential treatment when compared to the
general population, the effects of these domestic crises
on the KPA ground component have been significant,
especially upon units deployed within the rear areas.
There have been frequent reports of serious shortages of food, fuel, winter clothes, and other military
supplies for KPA troops. Soldiers are mobilized for
various labor requirements outside of the military,
such as factory, farming, or construction to meet statedictated quotas, in addition to their various military
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exercises, to earn foreign currency and supplement
their shortage in food. Morale and discipline problems
cannot help but increase, training has decreased,
and some units would have difficulty maintaining
operational readiness.196
Navy. The Korean People’s Navy (KPN) maintains
approximately 46,000 personnel, and its combat ship
strength has remained relatively steady between 600800 ships, which rank the KPN as one of the world’s
largest navies.197 The KPN’s world rating is only a
qualitative number. The ROKN may have a lower figure
of ships in its inventory (approximately 260 ships,
including submarines198), but it maintains superiority
on total tonnage and weapon and sensor technology.
For example, the largest ships in the KPN inventory
are the SOHO-class (1,845 tons) and two NAJIN-class
Light Frigates (FFLs) (1,500 tons each).199 Compare
these ships with the newest ROKN ships, such as the
Kwangaeto-class DDHs which are 3,900 tons each (three
units).200 South Korea has begun initial production of a
KDX-III destroyer which will incorporate phased array
radar technology and state-of-the art weapons.201
North Korea is assessed to have approximately
88 submarines, the world’s largest submarine fleet,
which is capable of slowing force generation through
naval mine laying, anti-ship torpedoes, and SOF
interdiction.202 Production of a coastal submarine, the
SANG-0 (meaning shark) class reportedly continues.
The majority of the KPN’s fleet is comprised of torpedo boat-size hulls which are from 60 to 200 tons. 203
Other small surface combatants include patrol boats,
patrol craft, and fast attack craft (which have a variety of
ground weapons mounted on them such as 85/100mm
tank turrets or 122 mm rocket launchers)—actually
designed as sea-going artillery.
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The navy’s most capable weapons systems are their
guided-missile patrol boats (over 30) equipped with the
SS-N-2A Styx anti-ship missile.204 Though their small
size limits operations to coastal waters and calm seas,
they have the capability to respond quickly to ships
approaching the coast.
Since 2000, the KPN has continued to modify
existing vessels and construct small numbers of patrol
boats, coastal submarines, hovercraft, and specialized
infiltration craft. Details concerning these developments
are not currently available.205
The peacetime missions of the KPN include:
• Defense of DPRK territorial waters and coasts;
• Seaborne insertion of intelligence agents and
special operations forces;
• North Korean coastal surveillance; and,
• Protection and control of coastal shipping and
fishing operations.206
During wartime, the KPN would be tasked with
amphibious lift and fire-support operations, support
to KPA ground force units, naval mine warfare
(both offensive and defensive), interdiction of enemy
shipping in waters adjacent to the Korean peninsula,
and rear area security.207
The KPN is divided into two fleets, the Yellow Sea
Fleet (west coast fleet) and the East Sea Fleet (east coast
fleet). The Supreme Naval Headquarters is located in
Pyongyang and controls both. These fleets have not
been detected exchanging ships, probably because of
geographical limitations which make mutual support
almost impossible.208
The KPN maintains a significant coastal
amphibious capability in which there are three types
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of amphibious operations: (1) strategic—a multibattalion operation; (2) operational—at battalion,
company, or platoon strength; and (3) tactical (Sniper/
Special Operations)—from company down to squad
or team.209 The KPN has a variety of amphibious lift
craft to include approximately 135 Kong Bang (literally
meaning “air bag”) class hovercrafts which can carry
approximately 40 troops (no vehicles) and travel at
speeds of 40 knots,210 as well as over 100 other types
of amphibious ships. 211 The KPA has the capability to
transport approximately 15,000 troops by sea at one
time, but doctrinally probably would use a handful of
hovercrafts for small unit amphibious raids.212
The KPN has a credible mine warfare capability
which was first developed in the Korean War.
Numerous surface ships and submarines are capable
of delivering mines within both the navy and civilian
sectors (merchant ships, fishing boats). Mines will be
used to defend against amphibious assaults, defend
strategic ports, and provide seaward flank protection
for land forces. The KPN has a large inventory of
outdated technological mines; although the total
number of mines is unknown, it is assessed that North
Korea has enough to satisfy their military objectives.213
Despite economic crises engulfing the country, limited
access to modern technical equipment from abroad
and fuel shortages which have restricted training and
operations, the KPN still maintains the capability to
conduct limited offensive and defensive wartime
operations.
The KPN’s experiences with operating an inventory
of both midget and coastal submarines and amphibious
hovercraft provide it with the wartime ability to interdict commercial shipping to and from the ROK, particularly in the East Sea (Sea of Japan), and to conduct sub-
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stantial amphibious lift and limited mine laying operations. The KPN’s limited abilities to operate at night and
in bad weather, as well as technical weaknesses in EW,
SIGINT, ASW, and shipborne air defense capabilities,
portend that the advanced weaponry and combined
operations capabilities of the USN and ROKN, together
with coalition air supremacy, would render the vast
majority of the KPN’s surface combatants ineffective.
However, the total numbers of KPN craft probably
would create an allied logistic ordnance nightmare in
providing the munitions needed to engage all of these
ships.
KPN midget and coastal submarine operations
undoubtedly would prove more problematic for
the USN and ROKN and would likely survive for
a considerable time. The KPN is primarily a capable
coastal defense force when coupled with land-based
coastal defense assets (artillery, surface-to-surface
coastal cruise missiles, defensive mining).
The KPA, to include KPN forces, has taken on the
U.S. Navy successfully with the capture of the USS
Pueblo and the tragic shoot down of a USN EC-121
reconnaissance aircraft, with no measured U.S. military
reaction against the KPN forces. Undoubtedly, the
KPN uses this as a morale booster.214
Air Force. The missions of the Korean People’s Air
Force (KPAF) include:
• Air and air defense of the homeland,
• Tactical air support to the army and the navy,
• Transportation and logistical support, and
• Airborne insertion of special operations forces.215
The KPAF has been reported to have over 100,000
personnel and an inventory of as many as 1,20054

1,700 aircraft, and it controls and operates all aircraft
(including the national airline—Air Koryo; there are no
NK civilian aircraft), airfields, and airports within the
DPRK.216 The KPAF retains a numerically significant
inventory of Soviet and Chinese designed aircraft that
date back to the 1950s and 1960s. However, in the late
1980s, Russia supplied a limited number of modern allweather air defense and ground-attack aircraft (MiG29’s).217
Interceptor aircraft are an integral part of the
DPRK’s air-defense network. Interceptors routinely fly
combat air patrol missions to protect DPRK coastlines,
military installations, and key urban areas.218 Although
the KPAF employs dated Soviet and Chinese ground
attack aircraft such as the IL-28/Beagle, Su-7/Fitter
and MiG-19/Farmer, these aircraft can only operate
in daylight and good weather. They only carry small
bomb loads for relatively short distances, except for
the IL-28 which can carry an air-launched version
of the Styx anti-ship cruise missile.219 As previously
discussed, the KPA appears to have replaced the longrange strike capability of its air force with long-range
artillery and surface-to-surface missiles.
The KPAF has been successful in intercepting nonNorth Korean aircraft operating near its coastlines. In
1965, two North Korean MiG jet fighters “attacked and
damaged” a U.S. RB-47 reconnaissance plane over the
East Sea, about 50 miles east of the nearest North Korean
coast.220 In 1969, KPAF North Korean MiG jet fighters
shot down an unarmed U.S. EC-121 reconnaissance
plane over the East Sea, about 90 miles off the North
Korean coast, resulting in the loss of 31 lives.221
On March 2, 2003, four KPAF aircraft—two MiG23MLs and two MiG-29As—intercepted a U.S. Air
Force RC-135S COBRA BALL reconnaissance aircraft
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conducting a routine intelligence mission over the East
Sea—approximately 130 NM from the DPRK coast. The
four aircraft shadowed the RC-135s for approximately
20 minutes, during which they signaled for the aircraft
to follow them and land in the DPRK, frequently
maneuvering within 20 meters of its wings. The RC135S aborted its mission and returned to its base at
Kadena Air Base, Japan.222
While politically motivated, the interception of the
RC-135S is noteworthy in that the mission showed
a considerable degree of pre-mission intelligence
collection and planning on the part of the KPAF, as
the aircraft were staged from their west coast bases
through air bases on the east coast. The MiG-29As
came from the 55th Air Regiment based at Sunchon,
while the MiG-23s came from the 60th Air Regiment
based at Pukchang. It appears that the pilots chosen to
perform this mission were among the best available to
the KPAF, and it also is likely that, given the potential
fallout of the mission, it was expressly approved by
Kim Jong Il.223
One of the KPAF SOF insertion aircraft reflects the
KPA’s use of unsophisticated and dated design features
to accommodate limitations in their technology.
The AN-2/COLT is a slow-flying biplane that serves
well in the role of insertion and extraction of special
operations forces. It is rugged and easy to maintain,
and can operate within all ranges of Korean climate. It
has a cruising speed of 120 knots, but can fly as slow as
35 knots in some cases and is well-suited to flying low,
using valleys to hide from radar. Its large wing area
and engine allows it to take off from dirt strips in 2,130
feet or from paved surfaces (such as roads or airfields)
in just over 1,300 feet. Maximum range for a stock AN2 with a full load is 186 miles, and they normally carry
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10 soldiers.224 Reportedly, KPAF has over 300 AN-2’s
and over 300 helicopters in its inventory.225
The DPRK’s air defense network is arguably one
of the densest in the world today, relying on surfaceto-air missiles (SAMs) systems and massive numbers
of mobile and fixed anti-aircraft artillery weapons. The
KPAF is responsible for ground air defense of the nation
and the ground forces (however, the KPA ground
forces maintain tactical air defense weapons to include
man portable air defense missiles [MANPADs].226
The DPRK’s air defense network is based on obsolete
weapons, missiles, and radars; and is most effective
at lower altitudes where masses of AAA fire can be
brought to bear on an intruder. Medium and high
altitude SA-2/3/5 surface-to-air missiles are ineffective
in a modern EW environment.227
The KPAF is assessed to possess only limited
offensive and defensive wartime capabilities. This is
based upon the KPAF’s inflexible and unsophisticated
command and control system, large numbers of
obsolete aircraft, low flight hours,228 limited access
to spare parts for its few modern aircraft, and fuel
shortages.
The KPAF is judged to be capable of conducting
a surge of offensive operations only during the initial
phase of any new war on the Korean Peninsula. It is
judged to have only a limited capability of guarding
DPRK airspace during peacetime. While the KPAF is
numerically superior to the ROK Air Force (ROKAF)
and U.S. air components deployed within the Republic
of Korea (ROK), it is qualitatively inferior in all
aspects.
North Korea has far greater air defense capability
on paper than it does in practice. It has not fought in
any kind of meaningful air action since the Korean
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War. North Korean efforts to transfer technology,
organization, and training methods from other nations
on a patchwork basis often leaves critical gaps in
national capability, even where other capabilities are
effective.229
It is unknown why North Korea has not modernized
its air forces. Whether a lack of hard currency (no
country will tender credit to North Korea to buy
military hardware) or lack of doctrinal emphasis,
the KPAF remains a low-tier priority. North Korea
probably will rely on the successful operations of its
SOF to destroy ROK and U.S. aircraft on the ground.
The KPN and SOF will attempt to delay coalition
resupply and reinforcement until such time that North
Korea has gained its military objectives.
One last reason for the KPAF atrophy may be the
reliance on North Korea’s new missiles and WMD
capabilities. The KPA may have determined that their
growing surface-to-surface missile inventory (800+), as
well as their chemical and nuclear capabilities, would
be sufficient to counter any enemy air threat.
Paramilitary and Reserve Forces. The establishment
of paramilitary and reserve type units within the
DPRK dates to the 1950s, although it was not until the
early 1960s and the formulation of the Four Military
Lines that the DPRK undertook concerted efforts to
increase the size, number, and capabilities of such
units.230 The DPRK’s paramilitary reserve forces total
almost 7 1/2 million personnel, with approximately 30
percent of the population between the ages of 15 and
60.231 This sizable force is organized into four primary
components: Workers’-Peasants’ Red Guard (WPRG)
(more than 4 million personnel); Red Youth Guard
(RYG) (more than 1 million high school and college
male and female students); Paramilitary Training Unit
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(PTU) (almost 2 million personnel); and the People’s
Guard troops (approximately 400,000 personnel).232
These reserve forces are estimated to be organized into
40 infantry divisions and 18 infantry brigades.233
The PTUs (a.k.a., Reserve Military Training Units,
Pacification Units, Guidance Units, Instructional Units,
Instruction Guidance Units, or Reserve Units) are the
primary ready reserve force of the MPAF and are capable
of being immediately mobilized and incorporated into
the KPA in times of war or national emergency.234 The
PTUs have the capability, training, and equipment to
execute the following peacetime missions: (1) maintain
a trained military force of KPA veterans who can be
immediately mobilized and incorporated into the
KPA, and (2) provision the security force for large
government buildings, facilities, and property.235
The WPRG, People’s Guard, and the RYG would
take longer to achieve combat readiness and probably
would be employed as rear area security units or as
reinforcements or replacements for regular KPA units
rather then as new combat units.236
Beginning during the 1980s, the KPA initiated a
series of force improvements to reorganize and revitalize
its paramilitary and reserve forces in line with newly
developing concepts of wartime operations. These
improvements included PTUs acquiring additional
artillery. They also were restructured and exercised
to facilitate out-of-area operations in support of
regular KPA ground forces. Finally, at the MPAF-level
(probably now at the NDC-level), a new command
structure was created for the wartime mission of rear
area defense.237
The entire lifecycle of the average North Korean
citizen is centered on some sort of military service that
begins as a young adult (15 to 17) where they usually
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serve in the RYG and finish in the WPRG at the age
of 60.238 The net result of this lifelong process is that
North Korea is one of the most militarized nations in
the world and is a country possessing a trained reserve
manpower pool that allows it to expand the size of
its active armed forces rapidly in times of national
emergency or war.239
A secondary effect of this lifelong military service is
that it provides an indoctrination that would improve
a North Korean insurgency effort significantly, if
required. Additionally, the North Korean people may
not be as receptive to an “invading” force whose intent
is to liberate them from tyranny.
Combat Readiness. Before examining North Korea’s
military readiness and capabilities, the definitions of
the terms should be clarified. A common analytical
mistake occurs when the same metrics used to review
U.S. military readiness and capabilities are applied to
an adversary.
The objective of the U.S. Army’s readiness reporting
system is to measure an organization’s readiness to
accomplish its assigned mission—in other words,
to measure how ready it is to go to war today, and
how effectively it could prosecute the war.240 These
metrics are used to satisfy the U.S. Army’s objectives
as they relate to U.S. National Military Strategy241 and
the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review—usually dealing
with issues of a global nature. North Korea’s strategic
objectives are regional and do not require the same
scope of readiness that the U.S. military requires. At one
point, the Pentagon considered readiness as only one
of four elements or pillars on which military capability
rests:
• Force Structure: The number, size, and composition of military units;
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• Modernization: The technical sophistication of
the forces, weapon systems, and equipment;
• Sustainability: The “staying power” of the forces
measured in days; and,
• Readiness: The immediate ability to execute a
designated combat mission.242
Readiness has been defined in many ways. Some
definitions, as Richard Betts pointed out in his book,
Military Readiness: Concepts, Choices, Consequences, are
fairly broad and synonymous with overall military
capabilities—for example, the “balancing of manpower, investment, and operations and maintenance
expenditures that produce the force structure capability
of rapid, sustained, and ultimate full response.”243
However, most definitions are narrower, focusing on
the ability to respond quickly. For this monograph, the
following will be used:
• The ability of forces, units, weapon systems, or
equipment to deliver the outputs for which they
are designed and to deploy and employ without
unacceptable delays.
• The capacity to perform missions when directed
to do so.
• A force’s ability to fight with little or no
warning.
• The fraction of a force committed to a fight
without unacceptable delays and that acquits
itself well.
• The ability of the currently configured force
structure to perform its assigned missions
promptly.244
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Deliver and Deploy Without Unacceptable Delays.
During the Korean War, lack of adequate logistics
hampered North Korea’s military forces and kept
North Korea from completely controlling the peninsula.
Thus, sustainability of the North Korean military
forces became a primary requirement, and the country
continues to maintain war reserves for all classes of
supply for 6 months of sustainability for regular forces
and 3 months for reserve units and paramilitary forces.245
A major increase in the number of active forces and the
deployment of many new types of weapons systems
in the past 20 years complicate this doctrine; however,
North Korea’s massive war reserve stockpiles continue
to expand despite the tremendous cost to its economic
structure and hardship to its people.246
On the negative side of the military-first rule,
due to the over-expansion of military roles, the overpoliticization of the KPA, and the “military sprawl”
in the North Korean society, the KPA’s primary role,
i.e., the military defense of North Korea, probably
would be downgraded and downplayed. Despite the
KPA’s continuous claim on almost half of the DPRK’s
government budget, its resources are still limited and
unduly stretched out. As a result, the KPA’s military
readiness suffers, and actual military capabilities
continue to deteriorate despite the military-first
policy.247
North Korea expanded its ammunition and
equipment storage capacities by building hardened and
underground facilities and enlarging existing facilities
as well as major national-level storage installations and
unit-level storage depots, especially near the DMZ.248
Current ammunition stockpiles are estimated at over
one million tons as well as major military POL war
reserves, despite the severe shortage of fuel supplies
for the civil economy.249
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The Nautilus Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology estimates that North Korean fuel consumption
for 30 days of full-time combat would be up to 200,000
tons, and it would take 4 months to restock military
fuel, given North Korea’s current supply rate, either
by bringing in fuel stored in rear areas or from refining
new fuel and then moving it into combat zones.250
However, one of North Korea’s military objectives
is to take the entire Korean peninsula within 30 days
and it could probably replenish its fuel stocks with the
numerous ROK civilian POL gas stations and supply
points.
Substantial food and combat ration war reserves
are stockpiled, despite widespread starvation and
malnourishment in recent years.251 Information from
interviews with North Korean defectors and World
Food Program officials suggests that the North Korean
food rationing system operates on a priority basis,
feeding KWP members and military and police officers
while leaving many ordinary people in hunger.252
Despite its improved harvest in recent years, North
Korea still suffers from a chronic food shortage, with
the country needing approximately 6 million tons of
grain a year to provide basic nutrition for its 22 million
people.253
Capacity to Perform Missions when Directed. North
Korea’s ability and capacity to perform its missions
when directed has not changed since the Korean War.
A survivor of Pork Chop Hill and Silver Star recipient,
Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) Earle Denton describes
the opponent he faced on the Korean peninsula: “The
North Korean soldier was a formidable warrior and
enemy. He was resourceful and tenacious on the
battlefield. He followed orders without deviation and
was willing to give his life for mission accomplishment
without question. He did not surrender.”254
63

Since the Korean War, the KPA soldier has had no
reason to change his ethic on performing his mission.
In fact, over 53 years of reinforcement by his chain-ofcommand concerning the “dark forces in the South”
probably has only strengthened the resolve of the
KPA.
The KPA currently is judged to be capable of
defending the DPRK, conducting special operations
against the ROK and Japan, and maintaining internal
security. It currently maintains the capability to
initiate a war of reunification against the ROK with
little warning; however, it has a declining capability
to prosecute such a war for an extended period of
time.255
North Korea has over 200,000 vehicles, 1,000
locomotives, and over 20,000 railcars that are mostly
nonmilitary but would be mobilized to support a
conflict.256 Much of this transportation is tied to reserve
force units that would provide a substantial part of
the logistic support required by military forces and
would move personnel, ammunition, and supplies
into the ROK during a conflict. Truck transportation
units would provide a full range of support. However,
shortages in truck transportation could be supplied
by North Korean SOF and agent-commandeered ROK
civilian trucks which would be plentiful throughout
South Korea.
Rail assets would provide heavy-lift capacity to
move armor, self-propelled artillery, and resupply
from national depots. Merchant and fishery vessels
would support naval forces and ground troops along
the peninsula’s coastal waters. The civil air transport
fleet would be mobilized to carry troops and high-value
cargo and possibly to deliver chemical and biological
warfare agents.257
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However, the KPA would still be hard-pressed to
provide logistic sustainment to KPA troops operating
well south of the DMZ. The KPA probably plans on
using South Korean fuel, food, and other logistics.
Information concerning the KPA’s plan to feed,
provide ammo resupply, and fuel its attacking forces
is unknown. This could be one of the primary factors
limiting DPRK from initiating an offensive attack.
However, South Korea has a plentiful supply of civilian
fuel stations for gas, diesel, and other POL products.
Some analysts have determined that urbanization
has taken maneuver ground away from advancing
North Korean ground forces. Additionally, during
any offensive, South Koreans fleeing Seoul and other
northern areas would clog the road systems and
further reduce North Korea’s ability to travel quickly.258
However, as South Korea continues to build new
modern highways, North Korean forces would have
no compunction about destroying or bulldozing cars
off the roads in advance of their mechanized forces.
Ability to Fight with Little or No Warning. North
Korea deploys approximately 65 percent of its military
units and up to 80 percent of its estimated aggregate
firepower within 100 km of the DMZ. Figure 6 depicts
the southerly forward movement of KPA forces over
the decades. North Korea theoretically could invade
the south without recourse to further deployments
and with relatively little warning time. However, this
forward deployment also is positioned to deter any
attack coming from the south.259 It is estimated that if
North Korea decided to initiate hostilities, the Republic
of Korea and the United States would have at most 2436 hours warning under ideal conditions, or as little as
12 hours if the KPA already was at an alerted status.260
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Figure 6. North Korea Historical Force
Deployment Toward the DMZ.
Force multipliers for ensuring success for any NK
offensive operations include surprise, the United States
being preoccupied in another major area of operations
(i.e., Operation IRAQI FREEDOM), or the location of
U.S. forces in the Pacific Command (PACOM) area
(i.e., 7th Fleet participating in an exercise in Australia
or conducting tsunami relief operations in Indonesia).
Fight with Unacceptable Delays. In 2000, North Korea
continued to improve its military, working hard to arrest
a decline in readiness and to upgrade its capability.261
Highlighting these enhancements was an ambitious
program to improve ground forces capabilities such
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as the deployment of large numbers of long-range
240mm multiple rocket launcher systems and 170mm
self-propelled guns to hardened sites located near the
DMZ.262
Defectors may provide the best insight into the
capabilities and readiness of the KPA. Defectors have
only limited information about military affairs, except
in the case of life in the army, which is experienced
by most men and many women. Because military
organization and capabilities are considered state
secrets, the best open-source information may still be
defector testimony.263
One questions whether the KPA would honor its
orders to initiate an attack without delay. Kim Nam
Joon, former KPA second lieutenant, stated that: “In
the first stages of a war, 90 percent of the KPA soldiers
would do as they were told—invade South Korea. They
are ignorant, they don’t know right from wrong.”264
Although this may lead North Korean soldiers to
conclude that their leaders have been lying to them,
it instead may become a motivator as KPA soldiers
become incensed about why their “brothers and sisters
in the south” have not provided assistance to the North
and have grown fat and corrupt.
Ability to Perform Its Missions Promptly. Mandatory
military conscription lasts 8 years on average, with
most servicemen performing the same job in the
same unit the entire period. This stability in the ranks
allows North Korean units to maintain readiness,
while limiting the expenditure of scarce resources.265
However, this readiness may be false. North Korea is
in a dilemma where they cannot reduce the military
force because of the immensity of maintaining the
large quantities of equipment in the KPA inventory
and of providing labor for construction (fortifying
the country and placing everything into underground
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facilities) and agriculture (the military must produce
its own vegetables and meat). Military bases try to run
greenhouses and farms, but they fail for the lack of
materials and proper management.266
Colonel Yoo Song Il, KPA Supply Corps, stated
that in 1992, there was 9 days of food reserve for war.
Daily food requirements for soldiers were 560 grams
(20 oz) of rice, 240 grams (8.5 oz) of other grain, 100
grams of meat (3.5 oz), 1 KG of vegetables (2.2 lbs),
20 grams of soy sauce, and 10 grams of cigarettes.
Kim Jong Il267 told them that soldiers must produce
their own meat and vegetables.268 Another defector
reported that malnutrition was spreading in the North
Korean military. This defector stated that before the
food shortage (probably a reference to 1999 when
reportedly 2 million North Korean citizens died from
malnutrition269), 800g (just over 22 oz) of rice and 200g
(7 oz) of meat was the official amount provided for 1
day; the soldiers have not been receiving the official
amount for more than 10 years. It does not seem to be
improving either. Rice has been replaced with corn or
potatos, and meat is only provided for holidays.270
A defector from Pyongyang stated that the effects
of malnutrition can been seen in the countryside as
students are stunted from a lack of food, and their
physical strength is diminished. The KPA used to
require that men had to be taller than 148 cm (58
inches) and heavier than 48 kg (106 lbs) but now that
requirement is reportedly down to 145 cm (57 inches)
and 40 kg (88 lbs).271
The effects of malnutrition degrade everything from
morale to body mass to mental faculties. One aspect
that all defectors report is that even though the military
is favored, there is still not enough food. Interestingly,
North Korea reportedly cannot feed its population,

68

but it has production lines running to produce tanks,
artillery, ammunition, aircraft, submarines, surface
ships, and missiles.272
Conclusions.
Reunification of the peninsula on North Korean
terms remains the foremost strategic goal of the
regime. North Korea’s severe and probably irreversible
economic decline places the regime’s survival in
question. Therefore, Kim Jong Il must see reunification
on their terms not only as their historic purpose, but
also as essential to regime survival (another stated
strategic goal). Continued investment in a powerful
military organized and deployed to execute an
offensive military strategy, despite its drain on a failing
economy, strongly suggests that North Korean leaders
perceive the military as probably the only remaining
instrument for realization of that goal.273
When evaluating an opposing enemy’s military
forces, the commander will always ask what are the
capabilities, the readiness, and the chances for enemy
success? One must also add the question, “Would
North Korea initiate an attack if its forces were not
ready or capable?” Its current leader, Kim Jong Il,
does not have the military training and experience
that his father had.274 However, Kim’s father’s actual
experiences and his father’s written experiences are two
different things; the son is no different in this area. This
differential view could lead to faulty or catastrophic
decisions similar to those Saddam made in regard to
military operations.275
In March 2006, USFK Commander General Bell
stated in Congressional testimony:
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Despite its apparent economic decline and political
isolation, North Korea continues to pose a dangerous
and complex threat to regional and global peace and
security. It maintains a massive, offensively postured
conventional force that far exceeds the requirements to
defend its country. There is little evidence to suggest
the regime will abandon its “Military First” Policy,
provocative diplomacy, nuclear challenges, missile
proliferation and illegal activities, all of which are
designed to contribute to its survival. North Korea will
continue to maintain its bellicose stance toward the rest
of the world, implementing limited policy and economic
changes, while subjecting its people to continued
repression. For now and into the foreseeable future, it
will remain a major threat to stability and security in
Northeast Asia and the world.276

North Korea’s exact military and WMD capabilities
may be incorrectly assessed, improperly evaluated, or
simply unknown in some respects. However, there is
no question that the KPA has significant offensive and
defensive capabilities which cannot be overlooked or
ignored. The debate continues as to what the KPA is
focusing on and what its intentions for these military
forces truly are. Whether or not these forces would
be successful in either an offensive or defensive role
probably is never questioned since it implies that
failure is a possibility. The KPA may be employed
based solely upon the whims of Pyongyang’s political
leaders.
Conventional military forces and asymmetric SOF
and WMD capabilities provide strong indications that
North Korea’s intentions are still focused on a strategy
of reunification by military force. If dictator Kim Jong
Il ordered the KPA to launch an attack or invasion
of South Korea, the North Korean military would be
ready to implement it without question.
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III. UNCONVENTIONAL FORCES
In addition to North Korea’s massive conventional
forces described above, the KPA possesses considerable
capabilities in terms of WMD and ballistic missiles.
The following sections of this monograph examine
the origins, evolution, capabilities, intentions, and
doctrines of North Korea’s nuclear, chemical, biological,
and missile programs. The scope and magnitude of
these collective efforts simply are remarkable, and
there is little doubt that Pyongyang has “pursued
major weapons programs more single-mindedly than
other communist regimes, save perhaps Moscow and
Beijing.”277
WMD/Nuclear.
This section examines the origins, evolution, and
capabilities of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program,
and explores the strategic rationale, and doctrine of
this program.
Origins and Evolution of the Nuclear Program.
Origins. The DPRK’s quest for a nuclear program
began in the 1950s, as a reaction to nuclear threats
from the United States.278 This was reinforced by the
knowledge that South Korea was pursuing its own
nuclear program.279 Moreover, Pyongyang’s desire
was influenced by the Cold War context in which
Moscow and Washington were providing peaceful
nuclear technology to their respective allies around the
world.280 In 1956 Pyongyang signed two agreements
with Moscow that provided for Soviet assistance in
North Korea’s nuclear research. Similar documents
were signed with China 3 years later. And North
Korean scientists studied at a nuclear research institute
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in Moscow.281 In 1959, the DPRK and USSR signed a
treaty whereby Moscow agreed to provide technical
assistance to establish a nuclear research center for
Pyongyang.282 In 1964—the same year that Kim Il
Sung proclaimed the “Three Revolutionary Forces
of Unification”—Soviet and North Korean scientists
founded a nuclear research center at Yongbyon.283 The
following year, a small “research reactor” was set up
in North Korea by Soviet scientists. The reactor began
operation either in 1965 or 1967.284
When did Pyongyang begin to develop a nuclear
weapons program in earnest? We believe this was
probably on the minds of DPRK leaders from the
outset. But the decision to aggressively pursue a nuclear
program very likely was made in the mid-1950s, but if
not, then almost certainly 2 decades later by the mid1970s.285 Indeed, it was during this later period that
Pyongyang renewed its efforts to develop its nuclear
program under the impetus of efforts by Seoul to
develop its own indigenous nuclear weapons program.
South Korea was persuaded by the United States
to end its program in exchange for ironclad security
guarantees, including protection under the U.S. nuclear
umbrella.286 Kim Il Sung reportedly requested China’s
help in establishing North Korea’s indigenous nuclear
weapons program as well as protecting North Korea
under the Chinese nuclear umbrella. Beijing provided
training for Pyongyang scientists and technicians and
perhaps the transfer of technology.287
In 1974 North Korea modernized and upgraded
the Soviet research reactor. At about the same time,
Pyongyang began to construct another research
reactor.288 “In the mid-1970s, North Korea reportedly
negotiated with the Soviet Union over the purchase
of additional nuclear reactors” and North Korean
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scientists continued to train at Soviet research institutes.
In the early 1980s a Soviet graphite reactor began
operating.289
Evolution. North Korea’s effort to develop nuclear
weapons was redoubled during the early 1980s.290
At this time, North Korea also constructed a second
reactor at Yongbyon that was designed domestically.291
Pyongyang “began construction of a 200 MWe nuclear
reactor and nuclear reprocessing facilities at Taechon
and Yongbyon, respectively, and conducted high
explosive detonation tests.”292
During the mid-1980s, the United States began to
pay close attention to evidence of increasing activity in
North Korea’s nuclear program. What alarmed analysts
was that the reactor design and disposition suggested
that Pyongyang was pursuing nuclear weapons
development. The reactor appeared to be based on
European models that produced a considerable amount
of plutonium, and it did not seem to be hooked up to
any power grid.293
On December 12, 1985, North Korea signed the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) apparently
because Moscow offered to provide four reactors to
Pyongyang but only on the condition it first signed
the treaty. However, these reactors never were
delivered.294 Then for 3 years, North Korea stalled over
an agreement for inspections of its nuclear facilities.
In 1986 a 20 megawatt thermal reactor near Yongbyon
began operating.295 Of particular concern was the
establishment of a plutonium reprocessing facility
at Yongbyon which reportedly has been supplying
plutonium since 1989.296 In February 1992, North Korea
reached an inspection agreement with the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and 4 months later
began permitting inspections. The findings of these
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inspections identified significant inconsistencies with
the answers and documentation provided to the IAEA
by the DPRK and set off a flurry of concern about what
North Korea was doing secretly. The major concern
was that North Korea had reprocessed considerably
more plutonium than it officially claimed.297
In March 1993 Pyongyang announced it was
withdrawing from the NPT. This led to talks with
Washington in June 1993. North Korea engaged in a
brinkmanship strategy that precipitated a crisis.298
By June 1994, the United States was pursuing a twopronged approach: working diplomatically through
the UN to impose phased sanctions against North
Korea, while at the same time preparing possible
military options. The crisis was defused literally in the
11th hour when former U.S. President Jimmy Carter
visited Pyongyang in mid-June. Carter was eager to
go and the Clinton administration permitted the trip,
while stressing that he was going purely in a private
capacity and not as an official envoy of the United
States. Kim Il Sung promised Carter that North Korea
would freeze its nuclear program and permit IAEA
inspectors to remain in the country, provided the
United States agreed to discussing the provision of
light water reactors (LWRs) to the DPRK.299
Negotiations began in July, with a short recess
following Kim Il Sung’s death on July 9, but resumed
again in August. The outcome was the Agreed
Framework of October 1994 signed by the United States
and North Korea. The agreement provided a clear
roadmap for improved relations between Pyongyang
and Washington, and committed the two sides to work
together to dismantle North Korea’s existing nuclear
program and build two LWRs.300 But the Agreed
Framework seemed doomed to failure as delays,
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disputes, and mutual distrust plagued the project. As
of March 2007, the project seems dead in the water,
and the LWRs remain uncompleted. Moreover, all the
while Pyongyang appears to have been pursuing its
nuclear program secretly. In the “second half of the
1990s,” Pakistan reportedly supplied North Korea
with “uranium enrichment equipment and perhaps
even warhead designs.”301
In the first decade of the 21st century, Pyongyang
has made provocative statements and engaged in
provocative actions. In October 2002, DPRK Deputy
Foreign Minister Kang Sok Ju told the visiting U.S.
Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific
Affairs James Kelly that North Korea possessed a
nuclear weapons program. Soon after, Pyongyang
removed the IAEA safeguard seals on nuclear facilities,
shut off the monitoring cameras, and expelled the
inspectors.302
On January 10, 2003, Pyongyang announced to
the world that it would withdraw from the NPT. It
restarted the 20 MWt reactor and reprocessing facility
at Yongbyon. By June 2003, it had extracted plutonium
from 8,000 spent fuel rods. This amount of plutonium
could have produced 25-30 kilograms for weapons.
Meanwhile, in April 2003, North Korean diplomats
told their U.S. counterparts that Pyongyang had
started reprocessing spent fuel rods (in storage since
1994). In October, North Korean publicly declared that
the reprocessing had been concluded.303 Eventually, on
February 10, 2005, a DPRK Foreign Ministry official
announced that North Korea possessed nuclear
weapons.
The conclusion that one set of respected analysts
draw is that “North Korea has an active nuclear
weapons program and may already possess enough
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separated plutonium to produce as many as nine
nuclear weapons.”304 Moreover, Pyongyang also has
a reprocessing plant and fuel fabrication, a plant at
Yongbyon, a 200 MWt reactor at Yongbyon, and 700800 MWt reactor near Taechon (construction frozen
under the Agreed Framework), as well as uranium ore
processing at Pyongsan and Pakchon.305
However, “it is impossible to reach a firm
conclusion about North Korea’s current nuclear
weapons capability.” A key reason is that experts
“cannot confirm how much plutonium North Korea
has.”306 Indeed, the possibility exists that Pyongyang’s
claim to possess nuclear weapons is “all . . . smoke and
mirrors.”307 Even after the October 9, 2006, underground
test, little is known about North Korea’s nuclear
program. The explosion appears to have been a small
one (under one kiloton) that did not reveal much more
about the program than previously was known.308 The
DPRK certainly would have good reason for claiming
to have nukes even if it did not. If other governments,
including the United States, believed the claim, the
“virtual” nuclear weapon would be a psychological
deterrent—not to mention offering valuable diplomatic
leverage. Determining whether Pyongyang possesses
nuclear weapons is made all the more challenging
because if North Korea does possess nukes, it is still
to Pyongyang’s advantage to be extremely ambiguous
about the precise details of its nuclear capability.
However, even if the DPRK actually does not possess
a nuclear weapon in 2006, the firm conviction of the
authors is that it is Pyongyang’s driving ambition is to
acquire nukes as soon as possible.309
Capabilities and Readiness. While there is no widely
accepted figure for the size of North Korea’s nuclear
arsenal, most experts estimate that North Korea
possesses at least a handful of nuclear devices. These
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estimates vary between one and 12.310 Since at least
1989, speculation has been that Pyongyang might
possess at least one or two nuclear devices. The most
responsible approach to estimating the size of North
Korea’s nuclear arsenal is to provide a range of figures.
Given the lack of concrete evidence, specifying a
particular number of devices is impossible. We believe
Pyongyang possesses anywhere between zero and 13
nuclear weapons.311 Even after the underground test of
October 9, it is still unclear whether North Korea has
weaponized a nuclear device and doubts exists over
whether the explosion actually was nuclear.312
If work restarts on the 200 MWt and 700-800 MWt
reactors, these would be able to produce plutonium after
several years. North Korea also could produce more
weapon material through highly enriched uranium
(HEU). While Pyongyang has denied using HEU to
make weapon material, it is believed to be doing so.
Indeed, in October 2002, Assistant Secretary of State
James Kelly accused his North Korea counterpart
of lying about this. After initial denials, the North
Koreans finally admitted for the first time that they had
an active nuclear weapons program. In fact, it would
be rather surprising if Pyongyang did not have a HEU
effort underway, given that North Korea is believed
to have millions of tons of extractable uranium ore.313
Moreover, North Korea has a sizeable strategic enclave
focused on the research, development, and production
of nuclear devices. One respected analyst contends that
Pyongyang has “about 3,000 scientists and research
personnel devoted to the Yongbyon program.”314
They reportedly live isolated in a vast and largely selfcontained complex.315
As for readiness, we do not know if North Korea is
currently capable of deploying (relatively easy)—not to
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mention launching (more difficult)—a nuclear weapon.
It should be noted that North Korea has been boasting
for at least 30 years that it possesses nuclear warheads
that can be delivered by missiles.316 Moreover, it cannot
be assumed that the delivery system is a ballistic missile
(see the discussion below).
Motivation and Doctrine. In any discussion of North
Korea’s nuclear program two basic questions must be
posed: First, why would Pyongyang want to acquire
nuclear weapons? Second, why would Pyongyang want
to give up its nuclear program? The latter question will
be answered in a subsequent section. Before answering
the former question, it is worth noting that Pyongyang
has devoted extensive amounts of time, effort, and
money in pursuit of developing a nuclear program. For
approximately half a century, the DPRK has worked
tirelessly to acquire and build an indigenous nuclear
program. While ostensibly Pyongyang’s goal has been
to produce its own peaceful nuclear energy program,
there seems little doubt that for at least 30 years—and
probably longer—the goal has been to produce a
weaponized nuclear device.
Motivation for Development of Nukes.
It is highly likely that North Korea’s quest for
nuclear weapons is not motivated by a single factor.317
Below we identify possible motivations and weigh
the relative importance of each. These motivations
are nuclear weapons for defense/deterrence (as a
“shield”), as an offensive weapon (or a “sword”),
as an independent strategic capability (or “its own
umbrella”), as diplomatic leverage (or a “chip”), and
as national prestige (or a “badge”). Figure 7 reflects the
possible evolution of North Korea’s nuclear motives.
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We suggest that the relative importance of these specific
factors has probably fluctuated over time.
1950s
1960s
1970s
1980s
1990s
2000s

Umbrella (someone else’s)
Umbrellas/Shield (aspirational)
Umbrellas/Shield [+Sword?] (aspirational)
Umbrellas/Shield [+Sword?] (aspirational)
Shield, Badge, Chip [+Sword?]
Shield, Badge, Chip [+Sword?]

Figure 7. The Evolution of North Korea’s
Nuclear Motives.
Defense/deterrence. The rationale most often given by
analysts for North Korea to pursue a nuclear weapons
program is for reasons of self-preservation—as a
shield.318 Indeed, the DPRK has used this metaphor.
According to an April 13, 2006, commentary in the
KWP newspaper, Nodong Sinmun: “The DPRK’s
possession of nuclear weapons is for self defense
from A to Z and serves as a powerful shield to defend
peace.”319 Pyongyang fears the massive military threat
posed by the armed forces of Washington and Seoul. A
nuclear program offers insurance against South Korean
conventional military (and economic) superiority.320
While the conventional militaries of the ROK and the
United States are sophisticated, considerable, and
probably appear daunting to North Korea’s leaders, it
is likely that they are equally, if not more, alarmed by
the sizeable nuclear arsenal of the U.S. military.
As North Korean Foreign Minister Pak Song
Chol told Soviet ambassador Vasily Moskovsky in
Pyongyang, in August 1962:
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The Americans . . . blackmail the people with their nuclear
weapons, and with their help, rule on these continents
and do not intend to leave. Their possession of nuclear
weapons, and the lack thereof in our hands, objectively
helps them, therefore, to eternalize their rule. They have
a large stockpile and we are to be forbidden even to think
about the manufacture of nuclear weapons.321

Any modest nuclear capability would at least allow
North Korea to claim a nuclear deterrent. This is not
deterrence on the massive scale of mutually assured
destruction (MAD) between the United States and
Soviet Union, each with its vast arsenals of nuclear
warheads. Rather, given the small size of North Korea’s
nuclear arsenal relative to that of the United States, the
deterrence lies in the real possibility that the United
States could not be certain of destroying all of North
Korea’s nukes in a hypothetical first strike.322 Indeed,
this is the rationale that North Korea used to justify its
nuclear program in the February 10, 2005, statement
and other pronouncements, including Vice Marshal
Kim Il Chol’s April 8, 2006, “Congratulatory Report.”323
Combined with the significant ballistic missile arsenal
the DPRK possesses, it presents at least the theoretical
possibility that North Korea can launch nuclear attacks
at the continental United States. Pyongyang probably
will be capable in the near future of nuclear strikes in
South Korea and Japan. At a minimum, this would
allow the DPRK to counter the U.S. nuclear umbrella
that Washington provides these two American allies in
Northeast Asia.324
Indeed, the desire for North Korea to possess nuclear
weaponry for defense purposes is highly plausible
for three reasons. First, many analysts consider
Pyongyang’s leaders to be extremely paranoid.325 They
are skeptical and distrustful even of those countries
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considered friendly to North Korea, such as China and
Russia.326 But North Korean elites are extremely fearful
of countries that are viewed as their sworn enemies,
notably the United States.
Second, North Koreans see themselves as the
victims of the threat of use and actual use of WMD for
some 60 years.327 According to the Foreign Ministry
statement of October 3, 2006: “. . . the DPRK has been
exposed to the U.S. nuclear threat and blackmail over
the past more than half a century. . . .”328 Moreover, the
atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki,
Japan, in 1945 resulted in the deaths and suffering of
tens of thousands of slave laborers working in Japan.
Some victims survived and returned to North Korea.329
Reportedly, Kim Il Sung was struck indelibly by the
destructive power of the bomb in these two cities and
how Japan swiftly capitulated.330 Furthermore, North
Korean leaders believe their country repeatedly has
been under nuclear threat from the United States since
the Korean War.331 The United States deployed tactical
nuclear weapons in South Korea until 1991, when these
weapons were withdrawn by order of President George
H. W. Bush. Whether these claims by Pyongyang of
perceived nuclear threats are true, exaggerated, or
completely false, is virtually irrelevant because many
North Koreans perceive them as incontrovertible facts.
And these “facts” constitute the context within which
Pyongyang conceives to be the essential importance of
possessing WMD and nuclear weapons in particular.
Moreover, as a prominent North Korean diplomat
stated, his country and the United States are “legally
speaking” in a “temporary ceasefire” of a half centuryold war that has yet to conclude formally.332
Third, the lesson of Iraq for North Korea is that a
country’s best insurance policy against U.S. attack or
invasion is the possession of nuclear weapons. Not
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having them is dangerous and leaves North Korea open
to bullying and attack.333 According to North Korea’s
ambassador to the UN, Pak Kil Yon, “Unless our
Republic possessed such military [including nuclear]
capabilities, it would have already been attacked by
the United States. Look at Iraq. A country falls unless it
possesses military capabilities.”334 Then, in the October
3, 2006, DPRK Foreign Ministry statement, North Korea
rationalized its intent to undertake a nuclear test: “A
people without reliable war deterrent are bound to
meet with a tragic death, and the sovereignty of their
country is bound to be wantonly infringed upon. This
is a bitter lesson taught by bloodshed resulting from
the law of the jungle in different parts of the world.”335
Pyongyang also at one time apparently was concerned
about a nuclear threat from Seoul. North Korea
reportedly was alarmed by evidence in the 1970s that
South Korea was developing nuclear weapons.336
While having an indigenous nuclear capability
can be appealing for strategic deterrence and national
defense, it may not always be in a country’s best
interests to show all its nuclear cards. This is especially
so when its program is undersized and in its formative
years. Indeed, a doctrine of “nuclear ambiguity” may
be preferred for reasons explained below.
Offense.
Some analysts have argued that North Korea has
not given up on the unification of the peninsula by
conventional force but is prepared to employ WMD,
probably including nukes, to further this goal.337 Others
have argued that even if Pyongyang has given up on
unification, it still might consider that the offensive
use of nuclear weapons is justified as a “sword.”
Prominent Korea security specialist Victor Cha argues
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that North Korea might use nuclear weapons to deny
U.S. military forces access to the Korean Peninsula.338 It
seems more plausible that North Korea would not use
nukes offensively unless the regime feared attack—to
preempt what it believed was an imminent attack by a
foe.
Autonomous/Independent Defense Capability.
Another motivation for North Korea to acquire its
own nuclear weapons would be to reduce dependence
on the Soviet Union and China.339 In the past,
Pyongyang had to rely on the nuclear umbrellas of
another capital. This left North Korea’s fate in the hands
of foreign country. Pyongyang was uncomfortable
with this arrangement, since Moscow and Beijing have
proved unreliable.340 Both of its patrons were suspect.
Pyongyang reportedly was shocked when Khrushchev
backed down during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis,
and betrayed when Moscow normalized relations with
Seoul in 1990.341 North Korea was concerned by China’s
unenthusiastic response to Kim Il Sung’s 1975 request
for Beijing’s help to develop a nuclear program for
Pyongyang and provide protection under the Chinese
nuclear umbrella.342
North Korea’s sense of urgency to acquire its
own nuclear weapons was heightened in the 1990s
when China was judged to have betrayed socialism
by shamelessly pursuing capitalism, the Soviet bloc
dramatically disintegrated, and the Soviet Union
subsequently collapsed. Moreover, this desire to
possess its own independent defense capability is
consistent with Juche ideology. North Korea should
never depend on another power for its own security.
Nuclear weapons may represent for Pyongyang the
ultimate Juche weapon.
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Diplomatic Leverage.
In recent years, a frequently cited rationale behind
North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons has been
diplomatic leverage.343 In other words, Pyongyang is
using its nuclear program as a bargaining chip in a
game of high stakes poker to extract concessions from
other countries, notably the United States. But North
Korea’s nuclear program may have been considered “a
diplomatic trump card” much earlier—perhaps as early
as the late 1950s.344 In the 1990s, Pyongyang negotiated
material benefits in the Agreed Framework it signed
with Washington in 1994. A decade later, North Korea
was reaping significant material benefits from China
and South Korea by participating in the Four Party
and Six Party Talks. But as Victor Cha rightly points
out: the bargaining strategy was not a motive for
acquiring nuclear weapons but instead an outcome of
the development of the program.345 By the early 1990s,
this certainly appeared to be the case. Some argue that
Pyongyang would be willing to negotiate away the
entire program, given an appropriate policy change by
Washington.346 Others argue that North Korea might
be willing to negotiate certain aspects of the program
but not to give up the whole program.347 In any event, a
leading Pyongyang diplomat stated in May 2006: “[I]t
is Pyongyang’s firm stand that improving relations and
dismantling nuclear weapons should be done after a
peace treaty has been signed.”348
Prestige/Status.
An additional motivation for a country to acquire
nuclear weapons is for the prestige that comes with
this status.349 North Korea’s leaders have inflated
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opinions of themselves and their country. North
Korea’s status as a member of the exclusive nuclear
club is a prestigious badge.350 But for North Korea,
the domestic audience may be equally if not more
important than foreign perceptions. There is little
doubt that this prestige motivation is very important
for Pyongyang.351 Would the legend of Kim Il Sung’s
genius be complete unless the Great Leader could be
lauded as the father of the DPRK’s very own nuclear
program? The pursuit of nuclear weapons by countries
such as Iran and Pakistan inspires intense feelings of
nationalism and pride.352 This also is true for North
Korea. Even ordinary DPRK citizens who may harbor
negative feelings toward the regime, live in squalor,
and have suffered tremendously likely take great pride
in the accomplishments of their country.353 Indeed,
the possession of nuclear weapons may enhance the
legitimacy of the leader and the regime in the eyes of
its elites and ordinary people.354
For some reason Pyongyang seems more coy or
reluctant to proclaim its nuclear status domestically
than it does internationally. The frequent source of the
DPRK’s strength in propaganda statements aimed at
its own people is the powerful unity of the people and
the armed forces.355 According to a “special” article in
the April 7, 2006, issue of the KWP newspaper, Nodong
Sinmun:
We have the weapon of single-hearted unity among
the leader, the party, and the masses, which is mightier
than a nuclear weapon. The strength of single-hearted
unity by our party, army, and people centered on the
nerve center of the revolution is infinite. Our army and
people are equipped with the spirit of death defiantly
safeguarding the leader and the spirit of guns and bombs
and firmly convinced about the justice of our cause and
its victory.356
85

It is unusual to find explicit reference to nuclear
weapons. Even the annual New Year editorial of
January 1, 2006—usually the year’s most prominent
and authoritative statement of DPRK policy and
propaganda—makes no mention at all of Pyongyang’s
possession of nuclear weapons. Why might this be
so? It is possible that top DPRK leaders do not want
to suggest or imply that their countrymen and women
can let down their vigilance or ease up on their efforts
to keep North Korea an impenetrable fortress. By
stressing national solidarity and the righteousness of
its cause, the regime hopes it can exploit nationalism,
avoid complacency by DPRK citizens, and reinforce
the logic of complete obedience to the authorities.
Significantly, the one explicit recent reference to
nuclear weapons was aimed at a critical elite audience—
in Vice Marshal Kim Il Chol’s “Congratulatory Report”
of April 8, 2006, in which he gave full credit for North
Korea’s acquisition to Kim Jong Il.
The Defense Minister declared:
It is the great victory of the respected and beloved
Comrade Kim Jong Il’s outstanding military first
revolutionary leadership and our party’s military first
politics and it is the most powerful demonstration of
the correctness and might of the leadership and politics
that the military position of our revolution . . . has been
fortified into an impregnable fortress, and that our
country has proudly become an international military
power that has a nuclear deterrent for self-defense.357

Some 2 weeks later, on April 24, 2006, the 74th founding
of the KPA, General Kim Yong Chu, Chief of the KPA
General Staff, stated rather cryptically:
. . . [T]he respected and beloved supreme commander’s
extraordinary determination and steel-strong will . . .
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[has] prepared the mighty military deterrent [kangwiryo
khan kunsajok pkjeryogul] that is far beyond the approach
of any imperialist aggressor. This is a great achievement
that matchlessly glorifies the country’s dignity and the
nation’s pride.358

Very possibly, Pyongyang is responding as much
to domestic political pressures as it is to external
pressures. Even if there are no real domestic pressures,
Pyongyang’s leaders may perceive these to be present
probably among the elites and perhaps even among
ordinary North Koreans. In any case, the Pyongyang
regime’s nuclear program is one instance in which
DPRK leaders can take legitimate credit for a still
unfolding success story.
Pyongyang’s Nuclear Doctrine. North Korea may
or may not possess an explicit doctrine for its nuclear
arsenal. Judging from the experience of other states
that became nuclear powers, such as China and India,
it is quite possible that North Korea has yet to devise
one.359 Lack of attention to formulating a doctrine is
plausible especially since the consuming preoccupation
almost certainly has been simply to develop nuclear
weapons and then build an arsenal. Moreover, even if
it has done so, this probably has not been expressed in
the form of a written document. Of course, it may be
unwritten and only exist in Kim Jong Il’s mind!360
If one accepts that Pyongyang might not have a
formal doctrine, then it is relevant to ask: Why should
one bother with this intellectual exercise? After all,
isn’t it challenging enough to try to determine the
size and location of North Korea’s nuclear arsenal
and the capabilities its delivery systems? Admittedly,
intentions tend to be far more difficult to discern than
capabilities, but if we focus solely on one to the exclusion
of the other, it becomes impossible to assess the full
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scope of the threat.361 The intelligence community is far
better equipped intellectually and technologically with
capabilities than it is with intentions.362
It is only prudent to assume that at least some
preliminary thought in Pyongyang has been given to the
fundamentals of what the primary value of its nuclear
weapons program is and how North Korea might best
deploy and employ its arsenal. If one defines a nuclear
doctrine as simply “the supreme national view of . . .
[a state’s] nuclear capabilities,” then this becomes a
plausible and manageable exercise.363 In other words, a
doctrine can be understood to comprise a series of basic
assumptions about the value of nuclear weapons to a
particular country and why, when, and how a country
might employ them. Admittedly, we “lack a formal
creed that speaks to these issues comprehensively,”
but we can make a good faith effort using DPRK official
statements and documents.364 Nevertheless, as Victor
Cha states: “The nature of the exercise, given the black
box of DPRK intentions, is necessarily a deductive
one.”365
So, if North Korea had a nuclear doctrine, what
would it look like? What would one label it and
what would be its main features? At the outset, it
may be helpful to differentiate between what may be
Pyongyang’s current doctrine and what might be its
future (or “aspirational”) doctrine. The former is its
real existing one, while the latter is its desired doctrine.
Figure 8 categorizes possibilities of Pyongyang’s
existing and aspirational doctrine.
First of all, North Korea’s current doctrine is perhaps
best described as “Nuclear Ambiguity.”366 Even with the
apparent underground test of October 9, 2006, much
about the program remains unknown. Pyongyang
believes that its interests currently are served best by
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Nuclear Ambiguity

(More) Nuclear Clarity

1. Arsenal Ambiguity
1. Nuclear Clarity
(“We have nuclear weapons”)
(A nuclear test)
2. Doctrinal Ambiguity
2. Doctrinal Clarity
Offensive or defensive?
No Offensive Use Declaration
(“No monopoly on preemption”) 		
3. Employment Ambiguity
3. Employment Clarity
Strategic or tactical?
Strategic and tactical?
4. Targeting Ambiguity
4. Targeting Clarity
Major targets:
Identify major targets?
-countermilitary or countervalue?
-Japan, South Korea, U.S.?
5. Delivery System Clarity
5. Delivery System Ambiguity
What are they?
Identify delivery systems:
		
-Missiles?
		
-Aircraft?
		
-Maritime?
6. Umbrella Ambiguity
6. A Bigger Umbrella
North Korea umbrella?
An all-Korea umbrella?

Figure 8. Pyongyang’s Nuclear Doctrine:
Existing vs. Aspirational.
keeping its adversaries (and its allies) guessing about
both its capabilities and its intentions. And North
Korea is not unique in this regard. As New York Times
correspondent David Sanger has noted:
In this era, a nation doesn’t have to parade nukes in
the capital on May Day. In fact, it’s probably against
its interest to do so. All it has to do is create convincing
ambiguity—to leave the world wondering if push came
to shove and shove led to talk of a preemptive strike, in
a few short weeks the country could screw together a
workable nuclear program.367

It is important to note that “secrecy and ambiguity”
also have been hallmarks of China’s nuclear program,
particularly in the early decades, even after the 1964
test provided clarity that Beijing was indeed a bona fide
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nuclear power.368 During the first 12-odd years of the
reform era (1978-91), the “Chinese strategically relied
solely on ambiguity and secrecy about the precise size,
capabilities, and location of China’s nuclear forces to
ensure their survivability, and, hence, credibility.”369
Moreover, other states have deemed it prudent to
practice nuclear ambiguity—for example, India and
Pakistan until May 1998. And Israel continues to
practice nuclear ambiguity.370 Of course, states such as
Iraq under Saddam Hussein even can use ambiguity
shrewdly to hide a nonexistent program until either
another state calls its bluff or it eventually produces
actual nuclear weapons.
North Korean officials have stated explicitly to
the outside world on a number of occasions—both
privately and publicly since October 2002—either that
they have an on-going nuclear weapons program or
possess nuclear weapons. However, they have not
demonstrated this beyond all doubt by either testing
or permitting inspectors to verify this conclusively.
North Korea has not conducted a test or permitted
inspections or monitoring of its nuclear facilities since
IAEA inspectors were expelled in December 2002.
What may be crucial in persuading adversaries that
North Korea actually possesses a nuclear capability
are “claims that adversaries and the international
nonproliferation community make” concerning the
program. These “claims serve to advertise and often
provide evidence of a capability.”371
They have permitted groups of foreigners to take
carefully monitored tours of selected nuclear sites.
For example, a group led by Stanford University
academic John Lewis visited in January 2004. One
of the members was Siegfried Hecker, a nuclear
scientist from Los Alamos National Laboratories, who
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states that he was asked pointedly by North Korean
officials about whether he would be able to conclude
that Pyongyang possessed a nuclear “deterrent.”
Hecker said he replied that “nothing [I] . . . saw . . .
would allow me to assess whether or not the DPRK
possessed a nuclear deterrent if that meant a nuclear
device or nuclear weapon.” The officials appeared
disappointed with his reply because they insisted that
North Korea did indeed have a nuclear “deterrent.” In
a report Hecker gave to the U.S. Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations, he stated that he was unable to say
conclusively whether North Korea possessed nuclear
weapons. Indeed, in this report, Hecker repeatedly
used words like “ambiguities” and “uncertainties”
to describe what he found at the Yongbyon Nuclear
Facility.372
It is even possible that North Korea considers
its nuclear program a political asset rather than
a military weapon. In other words, rather than
something to be used if necessary, it is instead: (1)
the best psychological deterrent propaganda can buy
(“existential deterrence”);373 (2) invaluable leverage
at the negotiating table (a bargaining “chip”); and
(3) a source of substantial prestige both at home and
abroad (a “badge”).374 Indeed, “existential deterrence”
is arguably the most important element of the nuclear
doctrine of “second-ranking” powers such as China,
France, and the United Kingdom.375 Moreover, the
use of a nuclear program as a bargaining chip is as
important as its status as a badge.
Second, North Korea’s nuclear posture is ambiguous. In
other words, North Korea deliberately is vague about
whether its doctrine is offensive (“sword”), defensive
(“shield”), prestige enhancer (“badge”), or negotiating
leverage (“chip”). However, Pyongyang has warned
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that Washington does not have a “monopoly” on
preemption. Vice Marshal Kim Il Chol, Minister of the
People’s Armed Forces, in a major speech on April 8,
2005, stated: “[A] preemptive strike is not a monopoly
that only the United States can have, and we will never
continue to sit back and look on with folded arms until
the United States attacks us first.”376 At present, North
Korea’s doctrine almost certainly is defensive. This
is because Pyongyang’s leaders probably possess at
most a handful of devices and therefore are reluctant
to employ them except if attacked. Moreover, they are
likely to be uncertain about whether their delivery
systems are capable and reliable. It is important to
stress that this defensive stance could change.
Third, North Korea is ambiguous about whether it would
employ nuclear weapons strategically or tactically. Would
Pyongyang use its nuclear arsenal strictly against
strategic targets or would it use nuclear weapons
tactically against enemy military formations in order
to gain advantage on the battlefield? Both the United
States and the Soviet Union in the past deployed tactical
nukes, and China is considering this.377 At present, it
is highly unlikely that North Korea would pursue this
if only because of the small size of its nuclear arsenal
and ability to develop the technology to weaponize.
Yet, it is plausible that Pyongyang might employ
a battlefield nuke (or even a dirty bomb) within the
borders of the DPRK in order to deny access/deter an
invading military force. Of course, the primary focus of
attention at present concerns how North Korea could
strategically employ a nuclear weapon.
Fourth, North Korea is ambiguous about its targeting in
terms of countries and type of target. First, it is not clear
which countries Pyongyang is targeting beyond the
United States. Is North Korea also targeting Japan,
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South Korea, or some other country? Second, the
types of targets remain unclear. Pyongyang’s nuclear
doctrine could be counterforce, countermilitary, or
countervalue. Because of the small size of its arsenal and
limited accuracy of its ballistic missiles, we probably
can assume safely that it is not counterforce because it
would have a very unlikely chance of success.378 So its
targets likely would be large U.S. military installations
or high value economic, infrastructural, or densely
populated areas in one or more of these countries.379
Given the missile’s “relative inaccuracy,” it may
be more useful as a “terror weapon” against large
cities.380
Because of doubts over whether missiles could
reach the continental United States, North Korea
would likely concentrate on U.S. military facilities in
South Korea, the main islands of Japan, Okinawa, or
on Pacific islands such as Guam. It might also target
large cities in Japan. If South Korea is targeted, then
Pyongyang likely will seek to avoid nonmilitary
sites for propaganda reasons—deliberate (or even
accidental) targeting of Korean civilians by the North’s
nukes would turn public opinion against the DPRK.
North Korea would feel no such constraint where
Japan, Hawaii, Guam, Alaska, and U.S. possessions
in the Pacific Ocean are concerned. Nevertheless, it
is likely that Pyongyang would justify any attacks on
non-U.S. territory on the grounds that U.S. military
installations were located there.
Fifth, one might presume North Korea’s most obvious
delivery system of choice would be a ballistic missile, but
various alternatives should not been ruled out. Pyongyang
has an extensive arsenal of missiles. But their accuracy
has been suspect, and it is not clear if North Korea
has mastered the technology to produce a nuclear
warhead and deliver it on a missile. Moreover, while
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its short range and intermediate range missiles have
demonstrated they can at least go the distance (as far as
South Korea, the main island of Japan, and Okinawa),
both the range and ability of its intercontinental missiles
is unproven. In addition, with the exception of some
Short Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBMs), Pyongyang
has not been actively testing its arsenal of longer range
missiles since announcing a moratorium in 1999.
This missile moratorium ended when North Korea
test launched two SRBMs into the Sea of Japan on March
8, 2006 and another one on May 1, 2006.381 What this
moratorium meant, aside from questions about whether
North Korea has been able to produce a warhead,
was that there are continuing uncertainties about the
performance of its missiles. This may lead Pyongyang
to explore other delivery systems, such as commercial
aircraft, ships, or even submarines. Indeed, North Korea
has extensive experience in the use of submarines and
merchant ships by its special forces. These forces have
used submarines for reconnaissance and infiltration. It
is quite conceivable that submarines, especially those
like Whiskey class submarines, which are considered
obsolete, could be used to deliver nuclear devices to
targets in South Korea and Japan. But North Korea may
not have mastered the technology capable of making
nuclear warheads. Any existing nuclear devices likely
would not fit into a submarine but could be strapped
to the outside of one relatively easily—a low tech but
workable option. An aircraft also is a possibility,382 as
is a ship. In either case, the vessel may or may not be
clearly identified by military markings.
Aspirational Doctrine.
What about North Korea’s “aspirational doctrine”?
What kind of doctrine would Pyongyang desire? It is
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likely that for the foreseeable future, Pyongyang would
prefer to have its doctrine cloaked in a significant
amount of ambiguity because it keeps everyone
guessing. It makes North Korea’s adversaries assume
the worst case.383 But at some point, North Korea
probably would desire to provide greater clarity—that
is, to provide some evidence to back up claims that it
does have nuclear weapons. The target audience for this
action would not just be the international community
but domestic constituencies also (the badge motive). The
most obvious act would be an actual nuclear test of some sort.
Under what circumstances would North Korea test? A
test probably would only be conducted if Pyongyang
felt a heightened sense of security or insecurity.384 In
the former situation, the trigger might be a settled
decision on the question of political succession to
Kim Jong Il; in the latter, the trigger might be fear of
an imminent attack on, or invasion of, North Korea.
Indeed, Pyongyang did detonate what appears to be
an underground nuclear test on October 9, 2006. It is
difficult to discern what motivated North Korea to test
at this particular time but the authors believe the test
was conducted from a position of supreme confidence.
Kim Jong Il made a reported media appearance with
senior military figures just days before the test. This
contrasts with Kim’s disappearance from view in the
period surrounding similar events in the past. But the
reasons for such confidence many not become evident
for some time.385
Greater clarity on the existence of its nuclear arsenal
would put pressure on Pyongyang to provide some
degree of doctrinal clarity. Other countries would press
for clarification regarding under what circumstances
North Korea would use its nukes. Pyongyang’s most probable response would be to grandiosely announce a doctrine
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of “No Offensive Use (NOU).” North Korea has declared
that it has been forced to develop a nuclear program to
protect itself from blackmail by, and growing hostility
from, the United States. A North Korean delegate at
the UN Commission on Disarmament stated on April
11, 2006:
The DPRK’s possession of nuclear weapons is a
legitimate right to defend its sovereignty today when
the Bush administration listed it as part of an “axis of
evil” and a “tyrannical” state and it is getting all the
more undisguised in its drive to overthrow it [the DPRK]
. . . . The DPRK cannot renounce nuclear weapons when
the U.S. is intensifying nuclear war rehearsals to make a
preemptive strike at it. . . .386

Therefore, Pyongyang probably would pledge
never to use nuclear weapons except in self-defense.
Under the doctrine of NOU, North Korea would
use nukes only if it was the target of either nuclear
or conventional attack by an adversary or felt attack
was imminent. In contrast, according to the “No First
Use (NFU)” doctrine, China declares that it will never
be the first country to use nuclear weapons.387 North
Korea’s October 3, 2006, declaration does mention that
North Korea will “never use nuclear weapons first,”
but the statement is extremely vague.388 However, it is
not clear whether this constitutes a pledge of NFU or
NOU. In any event, whether North Korea actually was
sincere about a NOU declaration, it would only stand
to gain from such a pledge. First, beyond simply the
statement, there would be no cost or action required
by Pyongyang. Second, such a statement would be a
propaganda victory that would be received favorably
in Beijing and Seoul. China and South Korea may not
be enthusiastic about an unambiguously nuclear North
Korea, but both countries would be prepared to adjust
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to and live with this new situation.389 Both Beijing and
Seoul probably would be most concerned not so much
about what Pyongyang would do, but rather about what
Washington’s response to the new situation would be.
Of course, there are good reasons for Pyongyang to
abide by its declaration just as there are good reasons
for Beijing to abide by its NFU. However, despite the
positives associated with publicly proclaiming NOU,
North Korea probably would press for some kind of
reward for making such a statement. Indeed, South
Korea and China might be quite willing to provide
some kind of aid in exchange for a NOU declaration.
North Korea may be reluctant or unwilling to go
much beyond the limited clarification just discussed.
However, whether Pyongyang makes its decision
explicit or not, the following developments seem very
plausible: the development of tactical nukes, and a
focus on countermilitary and countervalue targets,
combined with a triad of delivery systems all used in a
distinctly North Korean way.
Moreover, in the future, the DPRK may insist
that its nuclear deterrent is a “Unification Umbrella.”
The current expectation is that Pyongyang’s nuclear
umbrella covers all internationally recognized North
Korean territory and assets. However, as noted above,
the DPRK believes it is the rightful government of the
entire peninsula (both north and south of the DMZ).
Thus, the implicit assumption may soon (or already)
be that North Korea’s nuclear umbrella is for the
protection of both North and South Korea. As such,
Pyongyang would promote its bomb as an instrument
of unification. Pyongyang would insist to Seoul that
its umbrella would protect both Koreas from coercive
threats and machinations from more powerful
neighbors to include not just Japan or the United States,
but also China and Russia.390
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Analysis.
There is little doubt that nuclear weapons were
on Kim Il Sung’s mind from at least 1945 on. He was
impressed by the power of the bombs used on Hiroshima
and Nagasaki both in terms of their destructive capacity
and their value as a political weapon.
With the perception in Pyongyang during the
Korean War that it was constantly under the threat
of nuclear weapons, Kim had every reason to seek a
nuclear deterrent.391 Most immediately and obviously,
he looked to Moscow to provide his regime the
protection of its nuclear umbrella (see Figure 7) during
the 1950s and for the next 3 decades (until the 1990s).392
Kim also reportedly looked to Beijing for protection
under its nuclear umbrella.393 It seems hard to believe
that the sole intention driving North Korea’s efforts to
acquire a nuclear program was as a source of energy
for peaceful use. Indeed, this is highly implausible for
a number of reasons.
First, relying indefinitely on another country to
guarantee North Korean security runs counter to Juche
ideology and Pyongyang’s distrust of even its closest
friends in Moscow and Beijing. Indeed, after the October
1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, Kim reportedly began “to
have doubts about the reliability of the nuclear shield
provided by . . . the Soviet Union. . . .”394
Second, as Victor Cha notes, “Nuclear weapons offer
the most efficient means by which to optimize security
needs, abandonment [by the Soviet Union] fears, and
resource constraints.”395 Hence, it is only prudent to
assume that North Korea aspired to possess nuclear
weapons for defensive/deterrence (as a “shield”)
purposes starting in the 1960s. Chinese and East
German officials report that North Korea requested
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nuclear weapon technology from their countries in the
1960s, 1970s, and 1980s.396
Moreover, by the 1980s, Pyongyang even may have
aspired to use them as in an offensive capacity (as a
“sword”—see Figure 7). By the early 1990s, the Soviet
umbrella was gone, and North Korea repeatedly had
been told privately and publicly that it could not rely
on Beijing to come to its rescue militarily if Pyongyang
got itself into trouble. Implicit in this warning was that
North Korea could not assume it was protected by
China’s nuclear umbrella.397
Since that time, Pyongyang has viewed nuclear
weapons as a deterrent (a “shield”), a status symbol
(a “badge”), and as an valuable device for leverage in
negotiation with other capitals (a “chip”). All of these
dimensions are evident in the Korean Central News
Agency reports issued on October 3 and October 9,
2006—the former a Foreign Ministry announcement of
intent to test, and the latter an announcement that an
actual test had occurred. The October 3 Foreign Ministry
statement articulates the deterrent/shield motive: “The
DPRK’s nuclear weapons will serve as [a] reliable war
deterrent for protecting the supreme interests of the
state and the security of the Korean nation from the
U.S. threat of aggression and averting a new war.”398
The October 9 statement focuses on the badge motive:
“The nuclear test was conducted with indigenous
wisdom and technology, 100 percent. It marks a
historic event as it greatly encouraged and pleased the
KPA and people that had wished to have [a] powerful
self-reliant defense capacity.” Finally, the October 3
statement suggested that the nuclear program could
be a bargaining chip: “The ultimate goal of the DPRK is
. . . one aimed at settling the hostile relations between
the DPRK and the U.S. and removing the very source
of all nuclear threats from the Korean Peninsula and
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its vicinity. There is no change in the principled stand
of the DPRK to materialize the denuclearization of the
peninsula through dialogue and negotiation.”399
Why Would North Korea Give Up Its Nukes?
We have considered why North Korea would want
to acquire nuclear weapons. Now we will examine
why Pyongyang would want to give up its nukes. Or
phrased differently: under what circumstances might
Pyongyang renounce its nuclear program?
At least two conditions would need to be met: first,
North Korea would need to feel secure, to believe that
no country posed an imminent or direct military threat.
This condition would not be easy to satisfy. The level of
distrust and suspicion that Pyongyang harbors toward
Washington is great. Second, North Korea would need
to be adequately compensated (while this might be an
expensive proposition, it would be far easier to meet
than the former condition). Pyongyang never does
something for nothing.
But, it is highly unlikely that these conditions would
be met.400 Pyongyang has multiple reasons for keeping
the program and no obvious good or compelling reasons
to give it up.401 So why does North Korea repeatedly
express a willingness to denuclearize? It probably does
so for at least two reasons. First, Pyongyang regularly
proclaims its desire for a denuclearized peninsula for
propaganda purposes; to demonstrate that the DPRK
really is a peaceful regime.
Second, Pyongyang publicly aspires to a policy of
denuclearization in order to attract foreign aid and
other benefits. In 1991 North Korea signed a “Joint
Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean
Peninsula.” Under the agreement, which went into
effect on February 19, 1992, both Seoul and Pyongyang
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declared that they “shall not test, manufacture,
produce, receive, possess, store, deploy, or use nuclear
weapons.”
Moreover, both sides promised that they “shall not
possess nuclear reprocessing or uranium enrichment
facilities.”402 Two years later, under the terms of the
Agreed Framework, North Korea also committed itself
to denuclearization. Most recently, at the Six Party
Talks in Beijing on September 19, 2005, Pyongyang
signed the Statement of Principles declaring that it
would work towards denuclearization. In each case
North Korea received material rewards from one or
more countries.
Conclusions.
It must be assumed that North Korea possesses at
least enough plutonium to make a handful of nuclear
bombs. Still, one must also acknowledge that it is entirely
possible that Pyongyang does not have a weapon. As
noted above, North Korea has good reasons to play the
game of nuclear ambiguity. Nevertheless, prudence
demands that the United States and its allies proceed
on the assumption that the DPRK has anywhere from
between zero and 13 nuclear weapons.
Whether or not Pyongyang has an explicit and/or
written doctrine, it almost certainly has some guiding
principles/standard operating assumptions for when
and how to employ whatever nuclear devices it
possesses. At this point, North Korea’s nuclear doctrine
is best described as one of strategic ambiguity.
While one cannot rule out a nuclear first strike
by Pyongyang, given the extremely small amount of
nuclear weapon making material available and almost
certain massive retaliation North Korea could expect
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from the United States, it appears more likely that
North Korea’s nuclear doctrine is focused on deterring
an attack by the United States and as a way to gain
leverage at the negotiating table.
It is far from certain whether Pyongyang has yet
mastered the ability to build a nuclear warhead from its
plutonium stockpiles. Moreover, its preferred delivery
system cannot be assumed. Its first choice might be
ballistic missile, but this option may be discounted if
a warhead cannot be built. Furthermore, there may be
grave doubts about the accuracy of the missiles. This
may lead to the consideration of other options such as
air or maritime delivery.
WMD/Chemical Weapons.
Origins and Evolution. The DPRK demonstrated
great interest in chemical agents from the earliest years
of the regime. A Korean scientist with a degree from a
leading Japanese university, Dr. Lee Sung Ki, returned
to Korea after the war and soon began working—
initially in a cave laboratory—on the nascent North
Korean chemical research and development program.
Lee is not only credited with being a pioneer in the
development of Pyongyang’s chemical industry, but
also in North Korea’s determined drive to develop a
chemical weapons capability. The scientist is lauded for
being the inventor of an indigenously developed and
produced polymer fiber called vinalon which is used
for making clothes, tarpaulins, fishing nets, and other
items. Vinalon is trumpeted as a successful example
of North Korean ingenuity and self-reliance. Hence it
is sometimes dubbed the “Juche fiber.” Defectors also
have linked Lee’s name with Pyongyang’s chemical
weapons program.403
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Shortly after the Korean War, the Soviet Union and
China reportedly transferred to North Korea technology
they had acquired from Japanese and Kuomintang
chemical weapons programs, respectively.404 It seems
that Pyongyang commenced “pilot production” of
chemical weapons approximately a decade later. DPRK
leaders apparently considered this weapon to be “the
poor man’s atomic bomb.”405 But interest in chemical
weapons waned in the 1970s, only to be revived in the
1980s following their use in the Iran-Iraq War.406
Capabilities and Readiness. North Korea does not
acknowledge possession of chemical weapons nor
has it signed the Chemical Weapons Convention.
Nevertheless, Pyongyang is widely “believed to
possess large stocks of chemical weapons and precursor
chemicals.”407
According to a 2003 Center for Nonproliferation
Studies report citing the Commander of USFK, North
Korea has “large chemical stockpiles and is selfsufficient in the production of chemical components
for first generation chemical agents.”408 According to
a CIA assessment, Pyongyang probably has the ability
to produce “bulk quantities of nerve, blister, choking,
and blood agents.”409 These agents include sarin and
mustard gas.410
Experts conclude that North Korea likely produces
mustard gas and carbide for use as a sulfur mustard
agent. One piece of evidence cited is Pyongyang’s
known production of vinalon. According to one
researcher, “CW [Chemical Weapons] precursors
for sulfur mustard could be readily supplied by
North Korea’s ample carbide production capability,
the production of which is a preliminary step in the
production of vinalon.”411
Available evidence indicates an active chemical
weapons program with ongoing research, develop103

ment, production, and even testing on live subjects.
Defectors report political prisoners have served as
guinea pigs in experiments of chemical (as well as
biological) agents in the 1980s and 1990s, as well as
within the past 10 years.412
Most authoritative sources assert that North
Korea possesses at least eight facilities for the
production of chemical weapons, but there may be 12
or more.413 Chemical weapons reportedly are stored
in approximately six locations and in as many as 170
underground tunnels.414 Estimates of the size of North
Korea’s stockpile of chemical weapons range from
as little as 180 metric tons to as much as 5,000 metric
tons.415 Moreover, Pyongyang is believed to have the
capacity to produce thousands more tons annually.416
The means of delivery for Pyongyang’s chemical
weapons are believed to include mortars; MRLS;
FROGs; artillery; aircraft; and short range missiles
including Scuds, balloons, submarines; and special
forces.417 But the level of readiness is unclear, and it is
not known how quickly the weapon can be mated with
a particular delivery system.418
Motivation and Doctrine. What motive would North
Korea have to acquire a chemical weapons program?
The DPRK believes it was the victim of chemical
weapons used by the United States in the Korean
War.419 This is despite evidence that indicates the
United States did not use chemical weapons during
this conflict.420 Pyongyang apparently continues to
believe that it could be the target of chemical attacks. A
recent article published in North Korea contends that
“The United States . . . has the world’s biggest arsenal
of biological and chemical weapons.”421
Moreover, Kim Il Sung, the first dictator of North
Korea, firmly believed that it was essential his regime
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acquire a full arsenal of WMD to protect itself from
the threats of great powers and to promote the cause
of unification. In Kim’s eyes, the survivability of the
DPRK demanded that North Korea possess these
weapons to deter an attack by the United States and/
or South Korea.422
Pyongyang’s decision to pursue an indigenous
chemical weapons program was made at the height of
the Cold War when its two major communist patrons
either possessed a significant chemical capability
(Soviet Union) and/or were engaged in the research
and development of one (China). So initially, chemical
agents were viewed as a defensive weapon.
However, very soon KPA doctrine recognized
chemical weapons as a valuable asset in offensive
operations on the battlefield. According to one analysis,
“Reflecting Soviet military doctrine, the DPRK has
traditionally viewed chemical weapons as an integral
part of any military offensive. There are no indications
this view has altered since the end of the Cold War.”423
Thus, for Pyongyang, chemical agents are not seen as
strategic weapons but as [a] key operational accessory
that “would compliment to conventional military
power.”424 Moreover, judging from what is known of
KPA doctrine, “[i]t is likely that chemical weapons
would be used very early in the conflict rather than
held in strategic reserve.”425
A Republic of Korea Ministry of Defense study
reportedly estimates that North Korea would use
chemical weapons in the very first days of an attack
against South Korea. The toll among soldiers and
civilians wrought by chemical weapons could be
devastating.426 Use of chemical weapons on the battlefield would be expected to demoralize defenders, as
well as to complicate and delay defensive countermeasures. Moreover, although tactical use of chemical
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agents would raise the specter of nuclear escalation,
North Korea seems to assume this would not trigger
an automatic nuclear response of the kind that DPRK
would anticipate if it used tactical nuclear weapons.427
Therefore, Pyongyang probably would have a reasonably good expectation of escalation control. Indeed,
the KPA appears to have adopted an “operational [doctrine of] ‘first use’ of chemical weapons against strategic
targets (e.g., airfields, command and control centers,
ports, missile batteries) in the ROK at the onset of any
DPRK-initiated conflict on the Korean Peninsula.”428
KPA doctrine stresses the importance of strategic
surprise and continuous offense before the ROK is able
to mobilize and U.S. reinforcements can arrive. Since
the initial attack and first hours and days of a conflict
are crucial, every possible weapon and tactic that can
increase the likelihood of success must be used. Hence,
the KPA almost certainly looks upon chemical agents
as “a weapon of first resort.”429
Conclusions. The DPRK conceives of chemical agents
more as an operational force multiplier, rather than as
a strategic asset. Chemical weapons likely will be used
at the outset of any conflict against frontline forces via
artillery and against rear area targets on the peninsula
via long range artillery, SRBMs, and unconventional
means with the assistance of special forces. Moreover,
it is possible chemical weapons could be used against
U.S. military assets in East Asia delivered via MRBMs
or unconventional means. In short, it must be assumed
if the KPA launches an attack, that chemical weapons
will be employed.
WMD/Biological Weapons.
Origins and Evolution. North Korea has pursued
“basic research” on biological warfare since at least
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the late 1960s. But support for the program reportedly
waned in the 1970s. However, the program is believed
to have been stepped up the 1980s because of chemical
weapon usage in the Iran-Iraq War.430 Nonetheless,
North Korea continues to deny the existence of a
biological weapons program.
Capabilities and Readiness. The program appears
active but its precise status is unclear. According to one
group of researchers, the KPA has significant stockpiles
of biological agents and has the capability to produce
additional amounts, but does not maintain them in
weaponized form at present.431 These researchers
contend that in the early 21st century, Pyongyang has
a “rudimentary biological weapons capability . . . [even
though it] has engaged in biological research since the
1960s.” They state categorically that this biological
weapons program is, “not nearly as advanced as its
nuclear, chemical, or ballistic missile programs.”432
They believe that the DPRK possesses “. . . an
infrastructure that can be used to produce biological
weapons.” These experts contend that “North Korea
has pursued biological warfare capabilities since
the 1960s and can produce biological agents to use
within two weeks of deciding to.”433 However, another
specialist contends that one must “assume that the
DPRK possesses a stockpile of biological weapons
[which are readily useable].”434 In short, the state of
readiness is unclear.435
North Korea, according to the South Korean Ministry
of Defense, is “suspected of being able to independently
cultivate and produce such biological weapons as the
bacteria of anthrax, smallpox and cholera.”436 Similar
suspicions reportedly are shared by Russian and U.S.
intelligence analyses. One pair of studies produced
in the late 1990s focused specifically on the smallpox
virus, each reaching the independent conclusion that
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Pyongyang possessed an active smallpox program. The
U.S. study apparently based its conclusions, inter alia,
on defector reports and blood samples taken from KPA
soldiers which contained evidence of recent smallpox
immunizations.437
The suspected delivery systems for these biological
agents are believed to include artillery, missiles, aircraft,
submarines, balloons, and/or special forces.438 These
weapons can be used “throughout the Korean Peninsula
and possibly against Japan.” Moreover, North Korea
has “the ability to use these weapons worldwide using
unconventional delivery methods.”439
Motivation and Doctrine. North Korea’s biological
weapons program presents an apparent paradox. One
would expect Pyongyang to be very highly motivated
to pursue an indigenous program because of a firm
belief that it long has been victimized by biological
weaponry. And yet, it appears that in North Korea,
“biological warfare has not received the same attention
as chemical or nuclear warfare.”440
Koreans were subject to biological weapons
experiments by the Japanese military when Korea
was a colony. Moreover, North Koreans seem firmly
convinced that they were the victims of biological
warfare and experiments during the Korean conflict
between 1951 and 1952.441 According to one recent
articulation of the charges:
The U.S. imperialists dropped various germ bombs on
169 locations in the northern half of the Republic on
a total of 804 occasions during the period from early
January to March 1952. In addition, they disseminated
poisonous insects and various items laced with germs
in some 90 cities and counties in the northern half of the
Republic on some 900 occasions between January and
April 1952. The types of germ weapons used by the U.S.
imperialists during the war numbered some 20. . . .
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During the Korean war the U.S. imperialists . . .
also conducted barbaric human experiments on our
personnel. In 1951, the U.S. imperialists brought war
ships to the vicinity of Wonsan and conducted some
3,000 experiments using germ weapons against our
personnel on board on an almost daily basis.442

Furthermore, a number of Western researchers have
also asserted that the United States employed biological
agents during the Korean War but this conclusion
seems to be the result of sloppy scholarship rather
than based on any careful evaluation of all available
evidence.443
What explains the “rudimentary” state of
Pyongyang’s biological warfare program?444 One
analyst asserts that “biological weapons are seen as
strategic-level weapons with limited utility.”445 This
perceived limited utility may be a factor. Another
possibility may be that North Korea is deficient in the
required technical expertise. Pyongyang does appear
to view biological weapons as being “as dangerous
to its own forces as they are to South Korean or U.S.
forces.”446 Moreover, even a garrison state that devotes
an excessively large amount of its budget and vast
resources to building up and maintaining its defense
capabilities cannot do everything and must prioritize.
Under the circumstances, perhaps it should not be so
surprising that, compared to Pyongyang’s nuclear,
chemical, and ballistic missile programs, its biological
one constitutes a poor cousin. But at present, it is
unclear what level of importance North Korea attaches
to its biological weapons program. Certainly, biological
weapons are viewed as “strategic assets” that could
“inflict the maximum amount of emotional and political
destruction or disruption on the United States, the ROK
and Japan.”447 And these weapons could be used in a
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variety of scenarios or points in time—as a prelude to
conventional attack or as a last resort.448
Conclusions. Pyongyang’s biological warfare program is far less developed than its nuclear, chemical,
or ballistic missile counterparts. This is true in terms
of evolution, capabilities, readiness, and doctrine.
Nonetheless, it must be assumed that North Korea has
a significant biological weapons capability, along with
the will and means to employ them anywhere in the
world.
Ballistic Missiles.
North Korea’s ballistic missile program has been a
matter of considerable concern to the United States and
the international community for more than a quarter of
a century. In the 1980s and early 1990s, the primary
concern about North Korea was as a leading proliferator
of missiles and missile technology. Pyongyang certainly
remains a major proliferation problem and continues to
be labeled the “leading exporter of ballistic missiles to
the developing world.”449 However, since the late 1990s,
attention increasingly has focused on Pyongyang’s
testing and deployment of a growing inventory of
missiles for its own use. Certainly, the missile tests
of August 1998 and July 2006 have triggered waves
of anxiety in the Asia-Pacific, especially in Northeast
Asia.
This section examines the origins and evolution of
North Korea’s ballistic missile program, its capabilities
and level of readiness, considers Pyongyang’s possible
motivations for, and doctrine guiding, its missile
force.
Origins and Evolution of Missile Program.
Origins. North Korea began pursuing a ballistic
missile program in the 1960s, and during the following
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decade this program “became a national priority.”450
According to a leading analyst of North Korea’s
missiles, “[t]he most impressive attribute of the
DPRK’s missile program is the speed at which it has
grown.” This expansion has been possible because of
“significant external assistance” at various stages of
development.451
The earliest assistance came from Moscow in the
“latter part of 1960” when Pyongyang reached an
agreement with Moscow whereby the Soviet Union
would assist North Korea in modernizing its surfaceto-air missiles. This reportedly evolved into a broader
long-term agreement to modernize Pyongyang’s
missile arsenal.452
In 1965, North Korea founded the Hamhung
Military Academy which was charged with conducting
research and development of missiles. This coincided
with increased Soviet assistance following the ouster of
Khrushchev, especially on cruise missiles.453 However,
in the late 1960s, after relations with Moscow soured,
Pyongyang turned to Beijing. In September 1971, China
and North Korea signed a “wide-ranging military
agreement” to get surface-to-air and cruise missiles.454
Evolution. Four years later, in 1975, North Korea
reportedly commenced “a multi-faceted ballistic
missile program.”455 At this point “the missile program
became a national priority equal to that of the nuclear
program.”456
After continuing difficulties in Pyongyang’s
relationship with Moscow disrupted the flow of
missiles and missile technology to North Korea,
Pyongyang turned to other capitals, notably Cairo, for
assistance in continuing the development of its missile
program. Evidence also exists that Pyongyang has
engaged in technical exchanges with Tehran, Cairo,
Tripoli, Islamabad, Damascus, and even Baghdad.
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Moreover, in the course of building its missile program,
it appears that North Korea has obtained technology,
components, and materials not just from the Soviet
Union and China, but from Japan and a number of
European countries as well.457 One clear indicator of
the rapid growth and significant successes enjoyed by
Pyongyang’s program is that, since the late 1970s, North
Korea has been active on the international arms market
selling ”complete [missile] systems, components, and
production technology.”458
Certainly most of these items have been knock-offs
of original Soviet models, and the levels of technology
have been achieved through reverse engineering.
Moreover, the quality and performance of these
products have been mixed. Nevertheless, these sales
have promoted and advanced Pyongyang’s missile
program in at least two ways.
First, these sales have provided millions of dollars
of foreign exchange income. Second, since many
customers actually have used their North Korean
missiles, this has provided Pyongyang with a real
world laboratory in which to test the product. Of
course, this has enabled North Korea to improve and
iron out some of the flaws in its missile systems.
After producing a variety of short-range missiles,
North Korea began to focus on research, development,
and the eventual production of medium-range missiles.
Work on the No-Dong, an Intermediate Range Ballistic
Missile, reportedly began in 1988. There were reportedly
three main objectives that the R&D team had to work
towards. First, it was supposed to produce a prototype
that could deliver 1,000-1,500 kg warhead to a target
1,000-1,500 km away. Second, the team was expected to
produce a “base” missile system, and third, it needed
to design a prototype missile capable of delivering a
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nuclear warhead. In short, a nuclear-tipped missile
that could reach targets in Japan, including U.S. bases
in Okinawa, and at the same time could serve as the
foundation for developing an even longer range missile
in the future.459
To accomplish the task, North Korea focused
on using scaled-up versions of existing short-range
missiles, with more powerful engines and improved
guidance systems. It also secured the services of
engineers from countries including Russia, the Ukraine,
and China.460 Additionally, there appears to have been
at least some level of basic cooperation with Iran and
Pakistan in the development of the No-Dong.461
Work on a new longer range series of ballistic missiles, which observers in the West dubbed Taepodong
—the DPRK designation seems to be Paektusan—began
in the early 1990s. The apparent goal of the program
was first to develop a prototype—the Taepodong 1—that
could deliver a warhead of approximately 1,000-1,500
kg in weight to a target between 1,500 and 2,500 km
away. The second variant in the series—the Taepodong
2—was to deliver the same size warhead to a range of
between 4,000 and 8,000 km.
Once again, the R&D efforts focused on upgrading
and scaling-up the technologies and systems used
in the existing MRBMs, this time using a two-stage
rocket design. These longer range missiles appeared to
present far greater challenges to the R&D team than
earlier efforts because they required more attention
to the integration of more complex and sophisticated
systems.462
Capabilities and Readiness. As of early 2007, it appears
that North Korea may have 600 or more SRBM Scud
missiles and between 100 and 200 MRBM No-Dong
missiles. Since the available evidence indicates that the
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Taepodong series of ICBM missiles are still in the R&D
or testing stages, this means that Pyongyang may have
between 600 and 800 deployed or deployable medium
and short-range ballistic missiles in its arsenal.463
Long Range Missiles. With work on the Taepodong
long-range missiles still in the middle stages of the
research and development phase and in the very
early stages of tests, as of 2006, North Korea’s ballistic
missile threat beyond the Korean Peninsula and Japan
appears to be a hypothetical one (see Figure 9). In an
interview following the July 2006 test, former Secretary
of Defense Donald Rumsfeld revealed that North Korea
was thought to possess “three or four or five additional
Taepodong-2 airframes.”464 However, these missile
bodies probably are not launch-capable at present, and
no further tests of a Taepodong-2 appear imminent.
The partial success of the Taepodong 1 in August
1998 and failure of the Taepodong 2 to do much more
than simply clear the launch pad in July 2006 suggest to
experts that ICBMs are probably at least 5 years away
from being deployed along with Pyongyang’s growing
arsenal of SRBMs and MRBMs—and it could be as long
as 10 years.465 Much depends on the amount of testing
North Korea conducts of these missiles. According to
the former director of the Los Alamos Laboratory, “It
would take five or six tests of their final design before
they could be confident it could go some place.”466
Launch preparations for the Taepodong 1 and
Taepodong 2 take many hours, and there is usually
significant warning time before a launch. There are
also questions about the accuracy of these missiles.
Finally, Pyongyang’s presumed ultimate intent is to fit
this missile with a nuclear warhead, but it is not known
how close the North Koreans are to achieving this.
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Type

Range
(km)
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Warhead
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(Meters)

Launcher/
Fuel

Targets

Status

Long-Range
Taepodong 2

5,0006,000?

unknown

conventional
possible
nuclear,
biological, or
chemical

unknown

fixed,
liquid fuel

United
States

R&D
prototype
testing

Taepodong 1

2,200

unknown

conventional
possible
nuclear,
biological, or
chemical

unknown

fixed
liquid fuel

Japan
Okinawa
Guam

testing
deployed?
exported?

Taepodong X

2,5004,000

unknown

conventional
possible
nuclear,
biological, or
chemical

1,000
- 2,000

mobile,
liquid fuel

Japan
Okinawa
Guam

deployed?
exported?

Nodong

1,000

700

conventional
possible
nuclear,
biological, or
chemical

2,000
- 4,000

mobile,
liquid fuel

Japan

deployed
exported

Scud-D

700

500

conventional
no
information
on other
types

unknown

mobile,
liquid

South
Korea

deployed
exported

Hwasong-6

500

770

conventional
possible
nuclear,
bioligical, or
chemical

2,000

mobile,
liquid fuel

South
Korea

deployed
exported

Hwasong-5

300

987-989

conventional
possible
nuclear,
bioligical, or
chemical

800
- 1,000

mobile,
liquid
exported

South
Korea

deployed

MediumRange

Short-Range

Source: This figure is adapted from “CNS Technical Assessments
of North Korean Ballistic Missile Capabilities,” CNS Special Report
on North Korean Ballistic Missile Capabilities, Monterey, CA: Center
for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International
Studies, March 22, 2006, p. 10.

Figure 9. Selected Types of North
Korean Ballistic Missiles.
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Medium Range Missiles.
In contrast to the lack of North Korea’s long-range
missile arsenal being a reality, its medium-range missile
arsenal is very much one. Pyongyang is believed to
have deployed as many as 100 or 200 No-Dong missiles.
Unlike the Taepodong 1 and Taepodong 2, No-Dongs can
be launched from mobile launchers with “relatively
short launch preparation times.” How many launchers
North Korea possesses is unknown.
No-Dong missiles have benefited from more than 10
years of flight tests. During a test in May 1990 a NoDong rocket failed to even lift off and left burn marks
on the launch pad.467 In the July 2006 tests, North Korea
launched three No-Dongs. These missiles are capable
of carrying conventional or WMD warheads, but it is
not clear if Pyongyang has mastered the technology
to do this. As with most DPRK ballistic missiles, the
accuracy of the No-Dong is questionable. Nevertheless,
if North Korea can launch dozens of these missiles at
their intended targets (probably major cities in Japan),
there is a high probability that a good number will be
accurate enough to cause extensive damage and loss of
life.
Short-Range Missiles.
The first phase of North Korea’s initiative to build a
ballistic missile program was a project to develop shortrange missiles. “In the late 1970s, the missile program
became a national priority equal to that of the nuclear
program. . . .”468 This initial phase of the program
really took off in the late 1980s as Pyongyang became
a major ballistic missile producer and exporter. The
DPRK acquired its first ballistic missiles—a handful
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of Soviet-made R-17Es—from Egypt in 1979 or 1980.
Pyongyang soon began to reverse engineer this missile.
The fruit of this effort was the Hwasong-5, and by 1984
North Korean engineers had built the first prototypes.
In mid-1984 there were some half a dozen test flights
with mixed results. Small order production began in
1985, with the first full-scale production occurring the
following year.469
In 1987 Pyongyang signed an arms agreement
worth an estimated U.S.$500 million with Tehran.
Under the agreement, North Korea agreed to provide
as many as 100 Hwasong-5s to Iran and assist in setting
up a missile assembly factory there. Iran actually
launched “approximately 77” of these North Koreanmade short-range missiles against Iraqi cities in 1988.
The DPRK also sold Hwasong-5s to the United Arab
Emirates, although these missiles reportedly were
never used.470
Following the success of the Hwasong-5 (also known
as the Scud B), North Korea began to focus on developing
an SRBM with a somewhat longer range—the Hwasong
6 (aka Scud C). The KPA wanted a missile with longer
range that could reach all targets in South Korea. In
fact, the Hwasong-6 was identical to its predecessor in
most respects, including length and size. But it had a
lighter frame and carried a reduced weight warhead.
The result was a missile with a range of about 500km—
approximately 180 km further than the Hwasong-5.
Small scale production began in 1989, and full-scale
production commenced in 1990 or 1991.471
Currently North Korea is believed to have “over
600 Scud missiles of various types.”472 The Hwasong5 is believed to be able to reach approximately twothirds of South Korean territory, while the Hwasong6 has expanded range and can hit a target anywhere
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on the peninsula. Both missiles can reach USFK and
ROK bases and other targets in South Korea. One can
expect these Scuds to have “high explosive or chemical
warheads” and land with an estimated CEP of 1-2 km
of their intended target.473
The range and accuracy of these Scuds seem to be
improving constantly, with new prototypes developed
periodically. According to one report, some of the Scuds
launched as part of the July 5, 2006, tests were different
than the existing Scud models that North Korea was
known to possess. The Scud ER has improved accuracy
over previous models and an estimated range as far as
850 km—several hundred kilometers further that the
other Scud variants.474
Motivation and Doctrine. North Korea appears to have
multiple motivations for developing an indigenous
ballistic missile program. These include as an offensive
weapon (a “sword”), as a defensive weapon or deterrent
(a “shield”), as a source of foreign exchange income
(“cash”), to enhance the prestige of the regime at home
and abroad (a “badge”), and as diplomatic leverage (a
“chip”). The importance of these various motives has
altered over time. Figure 10 reflects this chronological
evolution of motives since the 1960s.
1960s

Shield/Sword

1970s

Shield/Sword

1980s

Cash/Badge, Shield/Sword

1990s

Cash/Badge, Shield/Sword, Chip

2000s

All of the above?

Figure 10. Motives for North Korea’s
Missile Program, 1960s-2000s.
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	A Juche Sword and Shield. The original impetus
was to create its own offensive capability against and
deterrent to the United States, Japan, and South Korea.
Initially, Pyongyang focused on medium- and longrange missiles to counter the United States and Japan.
In 1965 Kim Il Sung reportedly insisted:
If war breaks out, the U.S. and Japan also will be involved.
In order to prevent their involvement, we have to be able
to produce rockets which fly as far as Japan. Therefore
it is the mandate of [Hamhung] Military Academy to
nuture those personnel which are able to develop midand long-range missiles.475

A decade later, in 1975, attention shifted to short-range
missiles to counter South Korea’s development of the
Paekkom missile.476
Pyongyang wanted its own independent missile
force so that it would not depend so heavily on
purchases from or the protection of the Soviet Union
or China. North Korea was driven both by its own
insecurities and Juche philosophy.477
Cashing In. By the 1980s, North Korea recognized
the value of its missiles as an exportable product
capable of bringing in significant revenue. According
to one source, Pyongyang exported an estimated 250
missiles and missile technology between 1987 and 1992,
earning approximately U.S. $580 million. North Korea
reportedly has sold missiles and missile technology to
Egypt, Iran, Libya, and Syria.478
The Ballistic Badge. Increasingly, North Korea also
realized that its flourishing missile program allowed
the country greater global prominence as one of only
a handful of states in the world that was able to build,
deploy, and export ballistic missiles. Of greatest pride
without a doubt is the multi-stage Taepodong rockets
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that have the capability to travel several thousand
kilometers, and a variant which has the potential
capability to launch a satellite into orbit around the
earth. Moreover, these missiles are a source of great
prestige and status at home.479 The KPA could take
great pride in the program, as could other elites and,
indeed, even ordinary North Koreans.480 As such, the
program could be used to bolster or reinforce support
for the regime. Thus the propaganda value of missile
launches was considerable, and each was exploited to
this end. The Taepo Dong 1 launch of August 1998 was
done with much domestic fanfare. The regime claimed
that the two-stage missile successfully launched a
satellite that broadcast music lauding the exploits of
Kim Il Sung into orbit around the earth. In actual fact,
the missile splashed down in the Pacific Ocean east of
Japan, having failed to launch any satellite.
Bargaining Chips. By the late 1990s, Pyongyang
recognized that its missile program could be an
extremely useful bargaining chip to gain leverage in
negotiations. Hence in 1999, North Korea unilaterally
declared a moratorium on the testing of long-range
missiles. The moratorium won Pyongyang considerable
positive publicity and facilitated improved relations
with various countries (including the United States).
The missile program allows the regime to grab the
attention of the world, including countries in the region,
notably Japan as well as the United States, whenever
it desires. Other capitals are expected to reward
Pyongyang for not conducting tests, and when North
Korea does test, it extracts concessions and benefits in
exchange for promises that it will not test again for some
period of time. A prime case in point was the missile
test conducted in August 1998. Shortly afterwards,
Pyongyang declared a unilateral moratorium, and for
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almost the next 8 years sought largely successfully to
extract maximum benefit from this gesture. With the
July 2006 tests, North Korea similarly has positioned
itself to extract future concessions in exchange for a
promise not to test again for some period of time (see
below for more details).
July 2006 NK Missile Tests. On July 5, 2006 (across
the international dateline; it was July 4 in the United
States at the time of the launches), North Korea
launched a total of seven missiles—one ICBM, four
IRBMs, and two SRBMs. The ICBM, the third missile
in the sequence, barely launched—it broke apart less
than a minute after liftoff. All of the six successfully
launched missiles splashed down harmlessly in the Sea
of Japan. The tests, which were not announced ahead
of time by Pyongyang, provoked significant outrage
and consternation around the world. Of particular
note, 10 days later, the UN Security Council passed
a unanimous resolution “condemning” the act and
calling upon North Korea to reimpose its missile test
moratorium.481
The tests themselves did not come as a surprise—
there had been unmistakable indications for weeks
that Pyongyang was preparing for a test.482 Indeed,
there were many warnings and appeals from various
countries for North Korea not to go ahead with a
launch. It is quite clear that Pyongyang wanted the
world to know it was preparing for a launch. Would
anything have caused the regime to decide against
one? This is difficult to say, but the answer is probably
not. What did come as a surprise, however, was
the number of missiles launched.483 What was the
motive behind launching this many missiles beyond
the obvious shock value that North Korea’s leaders
must have anticipated? There are probably multiple
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motivations operating on at least two levels: domestic
and international.
Perhaps most important were the likely domestic
reasons for the tests. Two reasons in particular seem
most relevant. Since there is considerable prestige and
pride that the KPA and its military industrial complex
derive from the ballistic missile program, there was
probably considerable pressure on Kim Jong Il to
allow a test of North Korea’s medium- and long-range
rockets. There had been no test of such missiles in
almost 8 years (since August 1998). Thus, the test was
an opportunity for the armed forces to demonstrate
their prowess and “boost military morale.”484 Moreover,
there is considerable pride among ordinary North
Koreans over the accomplishments of their country’s
missile program. From a domestic standpoint the tests
would have been viewed as enhancing the reputation
of Kim Jong Il and the military and reinforcing support
for the regime. Second, the continued vitality of the
missile program requires periodic tests. Without these,
research and development would be stymied, not to
mention the promotional value for continued sales
of North Korea missiles on the international arms
market.485 With the exception of the Taepodong 2, the
targeting accuracy of the missiles appeared to be quite
good.486
Furthermore, of course, there were external factors.
The missiles were a clear reminder that despite
economic difficulties and a self-imposed missile
moratorium, Pyongyang possesses a potent and
sizeable ballistic missile capability. It is significant that
North Korea launched three types of missiles on July
5: long-range, medium-range, and short-range models.
This sent clear messages to Washington, Tokyo, and
Seoul that Pyongyang has the capability or at least

122

potential to target the territory each capital controls.
The short-range missile can reach South Korea; the
medium-range missile can reach Japan; the long-range
missile (which exploded shortly after launch) has
the potential to reach U.S. territory—at least Guam,
Alaska, or Hawaii. This was supposed to deliver a
message of deterrence to each country.487 Two factors
may have played a role in the timing of the lauches.
First, the timing may have been in response to the
RIMPAC 2006 exercise organized by the U.S. Pacific
Command in Hawaii. The maritime exercise began on
June 26 and ended on July 28, with the forces of seven
other countries, including Japan and South Korea,
participating.488 Second, the launches may have been
timed to counter the launching of the space shuttle
Discovery on July 4 from the Kennedy Space Center
in Florida. Furthermore, Pyongyang almost certainly
was signaling its displeasure to Moscow and Beijing.
The splashdown sites were uncomfortably close to
the Russian Far East and reportedly caused alarm in
the port city of Nakhodka. Moreover, China insisted
it was not given advanced notice of the launches, and
Beijing’s appeals to Pyongyang not to undertake the
tests were ignored.489
In addition, the launches can pave the way for a
return to dialogue by North Korea, providing key
leverage for Pyongyang in negotiations. The missile tests
express North Korea’s defiance but may also indicate
a desire to talk. Pyongyang is a skilled practitioner of
brinkmanship. The intent of provocative acts is to win
concessions and material rewards for suspending the
behavior and/or showing up for talks. North Korean
anger is almost certainly directed at the United States
at the contrast between the Bush administration’s
approaches to Iran and North Korea: Washington
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is prepared to talk one-on-one with Tehran but not
Pyongyang.490 According to the July 6 statement of a
DPRK Foreign Ministry spokesman, “suspension of
long-range missile test-firing . . . is limited only to the
period during which DPRK-U.S. dialogue is held.”
Since the Bush administration “completely shut off
DPRK-U.S. dialogue,” Pyongyang had earlier lifted
the unilateral moratorium.491
Certainly the missiles were criticized almost
universally (although admittedly far more harshly in
some capitals than others) and the UN Security Council
Resolution of July 15 was particularly condemnatory
(albeit toothless). Still, North Korea has proven quite
adept at brinkmanship. Pyongyang at some point will
seek to return to the negotiating table either in a bilateral
or multilateral setting. As two scholars observed, the
July 5 tests are meant to signal to Washington—“in the
ham-handed way that is Pyongyang’s specialty”—a
desire to talk.492 If North Korea has any thought of
returning to the Six Party Talks in Beijing, it would
prefer to return from an apparent position of strength
in which other states may be more likely to reward
Pyongyang for not conducting further tests. Of course,
North Korea would prefer to talk one-on-one with the
United States.493
Doctrine of Deterrence?
What reportedly has guided the development of
ballistic missiles are the ranges desired: 500 Km so
North Korea can target anything in South Korea; 1,0001,500 so North Korea can target U.S. bases in Japan and
major Japanese cities; 4,500-6,000 so North Korea can
target U.S. bases in Alaska and the Pacific Ocean; and
more than 6,000 km so North Korea can reach targets
in the continental United States.494
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The question is whether North Korea considers
these as defensive weapons—missiles of deterrence
as Pyongyang claims—or as offensive weapons. The
answer as far as the long-range missiles are concerned
is simple, at least for the time being. For the foreseeable
future, Pyongyang’s ICBMs largely are seen as having
deterrent value vis-à-vis the United States since North
Korea has at most a handful of airframes theoretically
capable of hitting U.S. targets in the Pacific.
What is much less clear is whether Pyongyang’s
short- and medium-range missiles are primarily for
offense or defense. The best answer is probably “all
of the above” because how these missiles are used
is probably situation dependent. In the event of an
actual attack or an attack deemed imminent on the
DPRK, these would be used in what likely would be
viewed as justifiable self-defense. But the missiles
also could be employed offensively if Pyongyang
determined there was a good chance of victory, or out
of sheer desperation. In the former case, North Korea
might believe, for example, that the United States
was distracted by a crisis elsewhere in the world, and
substantial forces that would otherwise be used for a
Korean contingency were committed out of theater.
In the latter case, the regime of Kim Jong Il might
conclude, owing to a domestic crisis, that it was in
danger of imminent collapse or overthrow and lash
out in a bid to save itself.
Another key question concerns whether the warhead
of choice for the missiles would be conventional or
WMD. Given the significant stockpiles of biological
and chemical agents North Korea is believed to possess,
use of these in a missile warhead cannot be ruled out.
In the immediate future, the most likely warheads
would be conventional or chemical. Biological agents
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probably are not in a readily useable form, and nuclear
devices have likely yet to be weaponized. Just as it is
in North Korea’s interest to be ambiguous about its
nuclear capability, it also is in North Korea’s interest
to be deliberately vague and even misleading about its
chemical and biological capabilities. Indeed, one should
anticipate that Pyongyang would practice deception
and engage in disinformation and claim that it is using
chemical or nuclear tipped missiles when it is not.
Conclusions. North Korea has had a ballistic missile
program for more than 4 decades. The program, created
by Kim Il Sung, has been a top national priority from the
start. Utilizing technological assistance from a handful
of countries, foreign trained technicians and scientists,
and reverse engineering, Pyongyang has succeeded
in establishing a credible indigenous ballistic missile
manufacturing base. The first phase produced shortrange missiles for export and domestic deployment;
the second phase produced medium-range missiles
for the same. In the third—current—phase, North
Korea has turned to R&D and testing—but not yet the
production, deployment, or export—of long-range
missiles.
As of 2006, North Korea is thought to possess
between 600 and 800 short- and medium-range ballistic
missiles. This number is only likely to increase with
steady output by the military industrial complex. And
if testing continues, then the DPRK eventually will
produce and deploy long-range missiles capable of
reaching Alaska, Hawaii, and, some day, the continental United States.
Given Pyongyang’s sustained devotion to this
program, it seems fair to characterize the DPRK as a
state that is “more interested in missiles than providing
electricity or food for its people.”495
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The short- and medium-range missiles were
originally produced for defense and deterrence against
the United States and South Korea, but the missiles
could, of course, be used offensively. Pyongyang
recognized that there was a market for missiles, and
North Korea could make money for exports of ballistic
missiles and related technology. North Korea’s missile
program also became important as a status symbol to
bolster the prestige of the regime both domestically and
internationally. By the late 1990s, Pyongyang realized
the value of the program for diplomatic leverage.
Conclusion: The WMD and Missile Threat.
These missiles could be fitted with WMD warheads.
The critical question is whether Pyongyang has the
capability to place nuclear (or chemical or biological)
warheads on any of its ballistic missiles. As then
Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld stated in mid-July
2006, it is not clear “whether or not they [the North
Koreans] have developed the ability to mate a nuclear
weapon with a ballistic missile.”496 Nevertheless, we
must proceed under the assumption that at present
Pyongyang can deliver a chemical warhead and, in the
not too distant future, will be able to deliver a nuclear
warhead on top of a short- or medium-range missile.
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IV. OVERALL CONCLUSIONS
As impressive as the above statistics are for both
KPA conventional and unconventional weapon systems, their actual capabilities are less than the raw data
suggest. The obsolescence of most North Korean equipment, shortage of spare parts, fuel, poor maintenance,
and limited testing and training all combine to constrain
capabilities. South Korea’s impressive improvement in
modern weapon acquisition, sophisticated technology,
and its strong, dynamic economy further tempers
North Korea’s potential for success in any offensive
operation on the peninsula. However, the success or
failure of the KPA may be a moot point since it is North
Korea’s perceptions that count and more importantly,
Kim Jong Il’s. If given the order to attack, the KPA will
do so.
It has been argued that North Korea’s military
strategy is designed around plans to launch an invasion
of South Korea. At the same time, North Korea’s armed
forces also are positioned to deter an attack. The KPA
is deployed to deliver a preemptive strike against the
South if Pyongyang believes that an attack is imminent
or to retaliate with overwhelming force if the North is
attacked.
WMD: Trumping Conventional Forces or a Winning
Combination?
North Korea continues to develop its nuclear and
missile programs. Moreover, questions remain as to
North Korea’s military intentions. Does Pyongyang
intend to use its WMD and ballistic missiles to replace
the threat posed by its eroding conventional forces? Or
is the intention to use conventional and unconventional
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forces in what it might view as a winning combination?
The answer is likely only to be evident in time as
analysts discern trends in North Korea’s conventional
and unconventional forces.
The KPA’s conventional readiness appears to
have atrophied. Does this mean that its conventional
numerical advantage is being overcome by South
Korea’s qualitatively and technically superior armed
forces? Of course, what is important is not the reality
but the perceptions in Pyongyang. North Korea has the
capabilities and abilities to initiate offensive operations
against South Korea. A more important question is
whether it intends to do so. If North Korea intends to
attack when conditions are deemed auspicious, the
KPA must rely on certain factors tipping the odds in
its favor (e.g., element of surprise, the United States
being deployed in a major conflict elsewhere in the
world). Just as important—if not more so—than the
performance of conventional KPA forces along the
DMZ would be the execution of numerous Second
Front operations by SOF forces in rear areas.
The combination of North Korea’s long economic
decline and enhanced U.S. and South Korean military
capabilities has diminished the ability of North
Korea to launch a successful invasion of South Korea.
Nonetheless, the KPA retains the ability to inflict heavy
casualties and collateral damage, largely through
the use of massed long-range artillery. In effect,
Pyongyang’s most credible conventional threat is to
devastate Seoul (and a good portion of South Korea)
rather than to seize and hold it.
North Korea’s conventional threat also is sufficient
to make an allied preemptive attack to overthrow the
North Korean regime a highly unattractive option. In
theory, U.S. forces could carry out preemptive attacks
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to destroy known North Korean nuclear facilities and
missile emplacements, but such attacks would likely
provoke North Korean retaliation and trigger a general
conflict. Moreover, Washington and Seoul cannot
overthrow the Pyongyang regime by force or destroy
its strategic military assets without risking devastating
losses in the process. Meanwhile, North Korea cannot
invade the South without inviting a fatal counterattack
from the United States and South Korea. Thus, the
balance of forces that emerged from the Korean War,
and which helped in maintaining the armistice for 50
years, remains in place.
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